



**Climate finance in the Pacific: An overview of flows  
to the region's Small Island Developing States**

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## **Climate finance in the Pacific: An overview of flows to the region's Small Island Developing States**

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### **ABSTRACT**

The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the Pacific face serious threats from climate change and will need significant international climate finance if they are to be able to respond. However, there is very little synthesized data on climate finance in the Pacific region. This paper aims to fill that gap by analysing published data reported by donor countries and multilateral climate funds to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee. The analysis covers 15 countries, collectively and individually: the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. It finds that in 2010–2014, a total of US\$748 million in finance principally targeting climate change was committed to those countries, almost all as grants. Around 59% was for adaptation, 36% for mitigation, and 5% for both together. About 72% was sourced through bilateral channels. Among the multilateral funds, the Global Environment Facility, combining the GEF Trust Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund, was by far the largest source through 2014, though since 2015, there have been several large allocations to some Pacific countries, particularly from the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience and the Green Climate Fund. The vast majority of the funding (86%) is being delivered as project-based support, while direct budget support is rare. In terms of sectoral distribution, the largest share of funding has supported work to create an “enabling environment”. Along with quantifying the data, the paper identifies patterns that warrant further exploration, such as differences between bilateral and multilateral flows and between countries. It also highlights the importance of making available more transparent, comprehensive climate finance data.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the Pacific face serious threats from climate change, particularly due to sea-level rise. Addressing these threats will require a wide array of adaptation measures, at a cost that far exceeds many countries' financial capacities. At the same time, governments need to continue to make crucial investments in development, which also helps build resilience to climate change, and in disaster risk reduction.

External finance is thus critical to the Pacific Islands as a way to supplement governments' own expenditures through the national budget process, and it is expected to remain so. However, there is very little synthesized data on climate finance in the Pacific region, which makes it difficult to know how much is being delivered or how it is used. Several studies and reports have provided some information, but it varies in depth, coverage and quality, making it difficult to identify patterns in the mobilization or use of funding. This information gap makes it difficult for governments and regional organizations to know how climate finance is flowing, and what kinds of outcomes it is delivering for Pacific peoples and ecosystems.

This paper aims to fill that gap by compiling and interpreting the available quantitative data on climate finance flows to the Pacific. It does this by synthesizing published data reported by donor countries and multilateral climate funds to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee's Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Data on international public financial support to developing countries is reported to the CRS by all OECD countries, some non-OECD countries on a voluntary basis, and some multilateral institutions and climate funds.

When donors report financial support to the CRS, they can tag individual components against specific international policy objectives, including climate change. Each component can be reported as either (i) primarily targeting climate change objectives, (ii) significantly benefiting climate change objectives (as a co-benefit), although the finance mainly supports another goal, or (iii) not relevant for climate change. The tagging process is done differently by each of the reporting entities, and there is no assessment of the accuracy or quality of the actual contribution to climate change action.

In this paper, the term "climate finance" is used to refer to the flows primarily targeting climate change. Overall figures for climate-related finance (including those significantly benefiting climate change objectives) are also provided, but the analysis concentrates on those flows which have objectives more explicitly related to addressing climate change.


We cover all the sovereign states of the Pacific: the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The main analysis covers the five-year period from 2010 (when the Rio Markers for both adaptation and mitigation objectives were used) to 2014, inclusive, although for the multilateral climate funds, the paper separately also describes financial approvals up to November 2016 (this data is available elsewhere and is worthwhile to cover, since there have been several large allocations to the Pacific in the last two years). A significant portion of this finance is delivered to the Pacific region as allocations for individual countries, but the data also includes components that specifically support activities at the regional level.

We examine the distribution of finance among recipient countries, the sources of finance, the share targeting adaptation vs. mitigation objectives, the spread across different sectors, the mode of delivery (e.g. project-based vs. direct budget support), and the types of intermediaries involved in programming the funds. It also compares committed funds with the



amounts that have been disbursed so far, although as explained in the paper, interpreting any differences between the two can be difficult, for various reasons. Throughout, we also highlight observable differences in how finance is delivered by bilateral and multilateral channels. The Annex provides snapshots of climate finance for each of the 15 Pacific Island countries included in our analysis.

**Figure ES-1: Summary of climate finance in the Pacific, 2010–2014 (committed amounts, in million US\$)**




In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$748 million** in finance principally targeting climate change was committed to the Pacific Island countries included in this analysis, including contributions for regional activities. This makes up about 6% of total flows for the Pacific reported in the CRS. The recipients of the largest amounts have been Timor Leste, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Fiji. By comparison, the largest recipients on a per capita basis have been Tuvalu, Niue, Cook Islands and Tonga.

Almost all these financial flows are grants. While there is external lending activity across the region, from donors and development banks, it appears this is for activities targeting other objectives than climate change.

Across the region as a whole, around 59% of the climate finance is for adaptation activities. Most of the remainder (36%) is for mitigation, although 5% targets both simultaneously. As to be expected, this proportion varies between countries.

Of the US\$748 million, 72% was sourced through bilateral channels. Australia has been the largest bilateral donor, followed by Japan, the European Union and New Zealand. Among the multilateral funds, the Global Environment Facility, combining the GEF Trust Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund, was by far the largest source up to end of 2014. Since the beginning of 2015 there have been a number of large multilateral allocations to some Pacific countries, notably from the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (US\$31.1 million combined to Papua New Guinea and Samoa), and the Green Climate Fund (US\$68 million combined to Fiji and Tuvalu, and also including readiness support to Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Vanuatu). These are not included in the US\$748 million for 2010–14, and are likely to have changed the overall balance between bilateral and multilateral sources, although data on the bilateral sources was not available for comparison.


**Figure ES-2: Sources, objectives and recipients of Pacific climate finance, 2010–2014**



The vast majority of the funding (86%) is being delivered as project-based support. Another 11% has come as technical assistance outside projects, and only 1% as general budget support and 1% as sector budget support. Most countries do not receive any direct budget support; it has been provided only to Samoa, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands.

In terms of sectoral distribution, the largest share of funding has supported work to create an “enabling environment”. Included under this label are activities supporting the development of climate policies, but also to mainstream climate change into national planning. For adaptation, the next-largest category of support is for research. For mitigation, the largest portion has gone to renewable energy, followed by enabling-environment efforts.

**Figure ES-3: Sectoral distribution of climate finance in the Pacific, 2010–2014**



Looking across the data, a number of interesting patterns emerge. Melanesian countries (Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) tend to have received the largest amounts overall, but this is not surprising, given that they are larger and more populous. Notably, however, Polynesian countries (Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Niue and Tuvalu) have been more successful at attracting climate finance than similarly populated Micronesian countries (Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Palau and Nauru). This is evident when both the total and per capita funds are considered together. In general, the Polynesian countries have attracted a greater diversity of funding sources, and have connected funding with a wider range of sectors, than Micronesian countries. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the reasons for this pattern, but it is a question worth considering, as it might offer useful lessons that could help all Pacific Island countries in future efforts to access climate finance.

The analysis also shows differences in the character of bilateral and multilateral funding. Bilateral channels work with a greater variety of “first recipients” (i.e. the intermediary organizations who help to programme and manage the funds), support work in a wider range of sectors, and have used delivery mechanisms other than project-based finance, such as budget support, even though project-based delivery is still their main mode of operation. Although not obvious from the data presented here, bilateral sources also have significantly lower transaction costs involved in accessing funding. Such differences are relevant to how well finance can be connected with countries’ overall development priorities. Bilateral sources appear to provide considerably more flexibility in scope, meaning perhaps greater opportunity to find synergies between climate and development outcomes. In the long term, flexibility is likely to be an important characteristic for countries trying to build resilience to a range of future uncertainties and challenges (including climate change).

Future decision-making by Pacific Island countries and regional support organizations could be greatly improved making available transparent, comprehensive data on how much climate finance is being mobilized for the region, and how it is being delivered and used. The CRS provides a comprehensive data set on public, international development aid, and on the portion of that support which specifically targets climate objectives. Although it has limitations, discussed in the paper, it is a useful start. However, there are considerable delays in data reporting, so speeding up the process of donor reporting would make this an even more useful resource for countries with questions about the provision of climate finance. It would also be helpful if international organizations and funders separated the Pacific region from Asia in global reviews of climate finance, so that what is happening across the Pacific’s small islands is clearly visible, instead of being merged with the much larger flows of finance going to Asia.

Finally, mapping financial flows is only one step in the process of trying to understand the quality of spending. Complementary analysis is needed on the quality and longevity of the outcomes being produced. This includes “bottom-up” perspectives based on the experiences of communities and countries where activities have been supported.



## 1. INTRODUCTION

Pacific Island countries face multiple challenges to their future security and prosperity, and climate change is among the greatest. Rising seas threaten to submerge low-lying areas and are increasing storm-surge risks and compromising water supplies due to saltwater intrusion. Ocean warming and acidification are harming fisheries and delicate ecosystems such as coral reefs that are vital for local food supplies and livelihoods. Infrastructure, already inadequate in many countries, is being damaged by storms, setting back much-needed progress. Building resilience to these risks will require significant investments in adaptation and development.

Yet many Pacific Island countries face significant fiscal challenges. Several have high and potentially unsustainable debt levels (PASAI 2016). Compared with other small island and middle-income countries, the Pacific Islands experience significantly higher volatility in both government revenue and expenditure, and aid flows; economic growth tends to depend on just a few sectors (World Bank Pacific Department 2013). Major storm events such as Cyclone Winston, which struck Fiji in 2016, and Cyclone Pam, which hit Vanuatu in 2015, have devastating economic impacts. Not only do people lose income and property, but economic growth is curtailed, inflation rises, and fiscal and current account balances are undermined (Veve 2013).

In addition, compared with neighbouring countries in Asia, some Pacific Island countries, such as Samoa and Vanuatu, appear to be spending more on climate change as a portion of both total government expenditure and national GDP (Miller 2012).<sup>1</sup>

In this context, external finance is clearly critical to the efforts of the Pacific's small island states to build resilience within social and economic systems and in the natural environments upon which these depend. Pacific Island countries have been vocal about their needs for finance to tackle development challenges, and particularly to respond to climate change. This is visible in high-level statements such as the Suva Declaration (Pacific Island Development Forum Secretariat 2015), regional meeting outcomes such as the Samoa Pathway (United Nations 2014), and in countries' climate action plans and nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, in which ambitious targets for renewable energy, in particular, are conditional upon receiving international finance.

Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), developed countries have agreed on a global target to mobilize US\$100 billion per year for developing countries to tackle climate change, and to scale this up over time (UNFCCC 2015), but without specifying regional or country targets. This means that there is competition to access and use the available finance, both among and within countries. It also raises questions about how this finance will be allocated and spent, and how funders and recipients will ensure that it is effective in catalysing real, long-term benefits for communities and for ecosystems.

To evaluate how finance is being used, we first need an overview of the financial flows themselves. If we have transparent and accessible information on what resources are being made available, we can begin to identify patterns in how finance is delivered and programmed, track changes over time, and highlight structural challenges or biases that influence the outcomes. Not only is this information fundamental for future decision-making

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<sup>1</sup> See [https://www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/all/themes/undp/images/publications/infographic/4%20CCF%20results%205%20Map\\_final070715-page-002.jpg](https://www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/all/themes/undp/images/publications/infographic/4%20CCF%20results%205%20Map_final070715-page-002.jpg) and [https://www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/all/themes/undp/images/publications/infographic/2%20CCF%20results%205%20Map\\_final070715-page-001.jpg](https://www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/all/themes/undp/images/publications/infographic/2%20CCF%20results%205%20Map_final070715-page-001.jpg).

by Pacific Island governments – it also enables a more informed dialogue with bilateral development partners and multilateral climate funds.

However, as detailed in Section 2, there is a lack of synthesized data on climate finance flowing to the Pacific Islands. A few detailed country studies provide estimates of finance being spent on climate-related objectives, but global syntheses typically combine the Pacific and Asia regions, which buries the Pacific component in the much larger numbers for Asia. At the country level, planning and finance ministries typically struggle to get a comprehensive view of incoming climate finance.

Pacific Island governments and regional organizations regularly emphasize *access to climate finance* as a priority. Less emphasis is given to its *effectiveness* or to possible criteria for assessing this. Very little research has been done on what kind of change it is producing over the longer term and who benefits. All this highlights the importance of detailed, transparent data on climate finance flows across the Pacific and what they are being used for.

This paper aims to help fill that knowledge gap. In particular, it addresses three sets of questions:

- How much international financial support for climate change is being directed to the Pacific, either to individual countries or to regional activities?<sup>2</sup>
- Where is it coming from, which organizations are involved as intermediaries in managing and programming the funding, and what is it being used for?
- In what form is climate finance being delivered? What instruments are being used, and how much of the finance is project-based vs. general budget support?

The analysis focuses on 15 Pacific Island countries, as shown in Figure 1: the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.<sup>3</sup>


It is important to stress that the main purpose of the paper is to quantify climate finance in the region and show how and for what purpose it is provided – not to assess what is or is not working well. Section 2 describes the methodology used for compiling data on Pacific climate finance. Section 3 presents the results of our analysis, showing where finance is coming from, where it is going, what it is used for, who is involved, and how finance is being delivered. Section 4 briefly highlights some patterns at the regional level that may warrant further study.

We are aware of, and respectful of, the political importance placed by Pacific Island countries on the distinction between official development aid (ODA) commitments and “climate finance” commitments, which follows from decisions under the UNFCCC that call for “new and additional” resources for climate change (United Nations 1992; UNFCCC 2010). Given the way data is reported by donors and funds, however, we cannot distinguish between the two in our analysis. Hence, we use the term “climate finance” in its broader sense: international financial flows that primarily target climate change, regardless of whether they are labelled as ODA or explicitly as climate finance.

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<sup>2</sup> Throughout the paper the term “climate finance” refers to the amounts of public financial support reported by donors and multilateral climate funds to the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) that are identified by the funders themselves as *primarily addressing climate change objectives* (see Section 2 for more explanation).

<sup>3</sup> These are the 14 members of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, plus Timor Leste, which since 2002 has had special observer status in PIFS and is also one of the Asian Development Bank’s 14 Pacific developing member countries (and is included in the ADB’s 2013 *The Economics of Climate Change in the Pacific* study).

**Figure 1: Pacific Island countries included in this study**

Source: Adapted from Australian National University's map of Pacific Island countries and their exclusive economic zones, available at <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/maponline/base-maps/pacific-eez-zones>. The 15 covered countries' names are framed in red. Note that Kiribati covers a very wide territory and is thus labelled three times.

## 2. OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH

### 2.1 Data gaps

There is no comprehensive synthesis of climate finance flows to the Pacific Island countries. Global mapping exercises of climate finance typically combine the Pacific with Asia, which renders invisible what is happening across the region of small Pacific Islands. This is true for the UNFCCC's *2014 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows Report* (UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance 2014), the *2015 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance* (Multilateral Development Banks 2016), and the global overview presented in the *Landscape of Climate Finance* (Buchner et al. 2015).

The *Climate Finance Regional Briefing: Asia and Pacific* (Barnard et al. 2014) provides only highly aggregated data and does not separate the Pacific from Asia (it does include a Top 10 list of countries by amounts approved, of which only one, Samoa, is in the Pacific). The database of Germany's bilateral contributions to climate finance<sup>4</sup> does not mention the Pacific at all in its general categories of data, though does enable specific searches for two of the countries included in our analysis, Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste.

There is little in the way of a comprehensive regional mapping of climate finance in the Pacific to help fill this gap. Tortora and Soares (2016) compile a useful analysis of climate finance in SIDS globally for the period 2011–2014, and for some parameters, disaggregate data at the regional level (i.e. Pacific) and by country. Many of their general findings are mirrored here. Betzold (2016) summarizes adaptation finance to Pacific Island countries using data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database, exploring some patterns in the distribution of funders and recipients. However, this covers only

<sup>4</sup> See <http://datenbank.deutscheklimafinanzierung.de>.

adaptation and also includes official development assistance (ODA) flows for which addressing climate change was a “significant” objective (i.e. a co-benefit), but not the main focus. Otherwise, regional-level analyses of climate finance have tended to focus on qualitative storylines and “lessons learned”.<sup>5</sup>

The most detailed quantitative assessments are the country-level Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIRs) and Pacific Climate Change Finance Assessments (PCCFAs).<sup>6</sup> These studies include both domestic public expenditure and external finance. As of mid-2016, CPEIRs have been published for Samoa (Nicholson et al. 2012), Vanuatu (Government of Vanuatu 2014) and Fiji (Government of Fiji 2015), while PCCFAs have been prepared for Nauru (Pacific Island Forum Secretariat 2013) and Marshall Islands; a similar analysis was done for Tonga (Ministry of Finance and National Planning 2016).<sup>7</sup>

A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) synthesis of some of the early CPEIRs for the Pacific and Asia (Miller 2012) identifies some emerging patterns. For instance, Samoa and Vanuatu appear to be spending more on climate change as a portion of total government expenditure than countries in the neighbouring Asia region,<sup>8</sup> and expenditure on climate responses is also higher as a portion of national GDP.<sup>9</sup> It is also clear that some countries rely more heavily on external funding than others for climate investments, and that typically the Pacific relies more on external funding than the Asian countries which have been reviewed.<sup>10</sup>

Additionally, there are a number of databases or project lists which contain useful information about climate-related activities in specific countries.<sup>11</sup> However, overall, although information about Pacific climate finance exists across multiple sources, it is of varying depth, coverage and quality, and does not easily allow patterns to be seen at a country or regional level.

## 2.2 Methodology

This study synthesizes published quantitative data on climate finance flows to the Pacific. As noted earlier, the data presented is a synthesis of “top-down” reporting by donors and various multilateral climate funds to the OECD’s CRS database.<sup>12</sup> The CRS includes ODA, which

<sup>5</sup> See, for example: Carbon Market Solutions (2010); Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (2012); Commonwealth Expert Group on Climate Finance (2013); Veve (2013); Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (2014); Secretariat of the Pacific Community (2015); UNEP Enquiry (2015); and Maclellan and Meads (2016).

<sup>6</sup> A CPEIR is a systematic qualitative and quantitative analysis of a country's public expenditures and how they relate to climate change. Such reviews have been conducted in many countries in the Asia-Pacific region since 2011, with technical support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). See <https://www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/about/what-cpeir>.

PCCFAs are based on a framework developed for Pacific Islands Forum countries to examine climate finance in a way that considers SIDS’ special circumstances. The framework was first published in 2013 (Pasisi et al. 2013).

<sup>7</sup> It is understood that assessments for several other countries, including the Solomon Islands (using the CPEIR methodology) and FSM (using the PICCFA framework) are planned or under way.

<sup>8</sup> See [https://www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/all/themes/undp/images/publications/infographic/4%20CCF%20results%205%20Map\\_final070715-page-002.jpg](https://www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/all/themes/undp/images/publications/infographic/4%20CCF%20results%205%20Map_final070715-page-002.jpg).

<sup>9</sup> See [https://www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/all/themes/undp/images/publications/infographic/2%20CCF%20results%205%20Map\\_final070715-page-001.jpg](https://www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/all/themes/undp/images/publications/infographic/2%20CCF%20results%205%20Map_final070715-page-001.jpg).

<sup>10</sup> See [https://www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/all/themes/undp/images/publications/infographic/8%20CCF%20results%205%20Map\\_final070715-page-005.jpg](https://www.climatefinance-developmenteffectiveness.org/sites/all/themes/undp/images/publications/infographic/8%20CCF%20results%205%20Map_final070715-page-005.jpg).

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, an inventory of climate projects in Vanuatu, <http://www.nab.vu/projects>, and an overview of UNDP projects in Kiribati, <http://www.adaptation-undp.org/explore/micronesia/kiribati>.

<sup>12</sup> The Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC) collates and makes available data that is reported by OECD countries and some multilateral institutions on their official development assistance. It also includes reporting by some non-OECD countries on a voluntary basis.

consists of grants and concessional loans with a grant element of more than 25%, as well as other official flows (OOF) and some private grants.

Reporting countries generally tag finance against the policy objectives of particular international conventions – including the UNFCCC – using the Rio Markers.<sup>13</sup> Reporting countries and institutions are able to code individual components of their development assistance as having climate change as its main objective (tagged as “principal” objective) or as having climate co-benefits even where the funded activities had other primary objectives (tagged as “significant” objective). In our results, we provide an overview of both, but then focus in depth on those financial flows for which climate change was the primary objective.

The data covers all reported bilateral and multilateral financial commitments for the period from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2014; due to a lag in the publication of CRS data, more recent figures were not yet available. Beyond the main analysis, we also include in Section 3.8 a short overview of the activity of the multilateral climate funds in 2015 through to September 2016, since this data is available through the Climate Funds Update website.<sup>14</sup>

As discussed further in Section 3, a considerable portion of the finance is reported as contributions to individual countries. However, on occasions where finance has been allocated for multi-country programmes and projects but where the data is not separated by country, this is included in the CRS under a “regional” category.

The remainder of this paper presents a regional synthesis; the Annex provides a summary of climate finance flows for each of the 15 countries. The regional analysis looks at:

- Distribution between different Pacific Island countries;
- Funding sources;
- Instruments (grants or other);
- Climate policy objective (adaptation, mitigation or both);
- Sectors targeted;
- The “first recipients” of the funding (“channel name” in the CRS), which is typically an intermediary organization that supports programming of the funding (although may not be the implementing entity nor final recipient); and
- Commitments vs. disbursements over the same period.

Due to the type of data reported to the CRS, the analysis is not able to cover other potentially interesting variables, such as final recipients of the funds delivered in each country; intended beneficiaries; the international or domestic organization(s) with primary responsibility for implementation; the distribution of overall project costs between in-country recipients and other organizations (e.g. implementing entities, consultants); or in the case of multilateral funds, the amounts allocated to proposal preparation relative to implementation.

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<sup>13</sup> The Rio Markers are statistical policy markers used to monitor external development finance within the OECD/DAC against several international policy objectives, including Climate Change Adaptation (introduced in 2010) and Climate Change Mitigation (introduced in 1998). A scoring system of three values is used, whereby development cooperation activities are “marked” as targeting climate change mitigation or adaptation as the “principal” objective, as a “significant” objective, or as not targeting the objective.

<sup>14</sup> See <http://www.climatefundsupdate.org>.

Since 2013, reporting to the OECD DAC on climate finance has included flows from the multilateral development Banks. As of November 2015, the six main MDBs are reporting project-level data on their climate-related development finance to the OECD DAC (based on climate related project components). However, this reporting is not necessarily to the CRS and is also not standardized. Therefore, activities from MDBs are not captured in the data analysed in this paper. For more explanation of MDB reporting, see <http://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/Treatment-of-green-multilateral-flows-in-OECD-DAC-statistics.pdf>.

We have not verified the validity of financial flows information, but rather accepted at face value the amounts reported to the CRS and the assessment of their relevance to climate change objectives by donors and funds. This is a limitation of the analysis. Application of the Rio Markers (attributing climate relevance) is based on a subjective judgement, and different analysts might reach a different conclusion about specific commitments, depending, for instance, on their knowledge of the local context (particularly when assessing adaptation relevance). In other words, the data reflects how funders report climate finance to Pacific Island countries, not how those countries assess the climate relevance of the funding.

### 3. CLIMATE FINANCE FLOWS TO THE PACIFIC

In this section, we present an overview of total climate-related finance in 2010–2014, and a detailed breakdown of climate finance by countries, sectors, policy goals and intermediaries. We also reflect on the different characteristics of funding being delivered through bilateral and multilateral channels, and on the role being played by dedicated climate funds.

#### 3.1 Overview of climate finance flows

CRS data indicates that in 2010–2014, the Pacific Island countries were allocated a total of US\$13.58 billion in development assistance. Of this, US\$1.76 billion (13%) is marked as broadly contributing to the objectives of the UNFCCC. Of this total amount:

- **US\$748 million** is reported by donors as having climate change as its primary objective. This total includes direct grants (likely the majority), as well as, potentially, “grant-equivalent” amounts where concessional lending has been used.
- A further **US\$1,014 million** is reported as having climate change as a “significant” objective (i.e. funds targeted to another purpose, but with climate co-benefits). This amount includes not only grants but also some lending components.

Caution is needed in interpreting the “significant” figure. It almost certainly overestimates ODA contributing to climate objectives, because even if only a fraction of the funded activities have climate benefits, the full value of the finance can be tagged as “climate-related”.<sup>15</sup> However, it is not possible to provide a more refined estimate without making a detailed assessment of each component from every donor over the reporting period. Also, as mentioned above, this figure includes some loans, which are also useful to countries but must be repaid.

As shown in Figure 2, bilateral channels make up a considerable portion (US\$538 million, or 72%) of the US\$748 million in finance principally targeting climate change, and an even larger portion (US\$917 million, or 90%) of the flows labelled as having “significant” climate co-benefits. The multilateral data includes finance from the dedicated climate funds,<sup>16</sup> and in theory can also include climate-related support from the multilateral development banks even

<sup>15</sup> For a project where climate co-benefits might be generated by particular components (rather than by all activities in the project), some donors may isolate these specific components and only report these amounts under the “significant” climate objective, while other donors may report the whole project amount. Given that for these amounts climate change is not the main objective, it is difficult to have confidence in whether the amounts of finance reported here are connected to climate outcomes. The same challenge exists in relation to donors reporting projects that have climate change as a “principal” objective, but in such cases it seems more reasonable that the full amount could be relevant, because climate change is the core reason for the transaction.

<sup>16</sup> Dedicated climate funds reporting to the OECD CRS are the Adaptation Fund, the Climate Investment Funds, and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and its Trust Funds.



if in practice this is limited to date.<sup>17</sup> The multilateral component tagged as having climate change as a “significant” objective is mainly finance provided by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) under its focal areas other than climate change (e.g. biodiversity, chemicals, land degradation, international waters, multi-focal).

**Figure 2: Climate finance to Pacific Island countries, 2010–2014**





Figure 3 shows trends over time in the amount of climate finance being delivered to the Pacific. Overall, the annual volume of climate finance roughly doubled in the five years from 2010 to 2014, and there was apparently a spike in 2013, though we do not know the reason.

**Figure 3: Trend in climate finance to Pacific Island countries, 2010–2014**




<sup>17</sup> Multilateral development banks have reported their contribution to climate finance since 2011. However, see footnote 14 for an explanation of why the OECD CRS data does not adequately capture their contributions.

### 3.2 Sources and recipients

Figure 4 shows the scale of contributions from different bilateral and multilateral sources (21 in total), and how climate finance has been distributed among Pacific Island countries.

Australia is the largest bilateral contributor (and the largest overall source), followed by Japan, the European Union, New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates. Among the multilateral funds, the largest contribution as of end of 2014 was a total of US\$131 million from the GEF, through a combination of its Trust Fund (focused on mitigation) and Least Developed Countries Fund (focused on adaptation). This also made the GEF the second largest source overall, after Australia. Other active multilateral funds include the World Bank Climate Investment Funds (US\$53.7 million) and the Adaptation Fund (US\$26.2 million). More recent allocations by the multilateral funds in 2015–2016 are described in Section 3.8.

**Figure 4: Sources, policy goals and recipients of climate finance to the Pacific Island countries, 2010–2014 (total of US\$748 million)**



On the surface, the largest single “recipient” is the regional category, but that is somewhat misleading. It does partly reflect the “regional share” of multi-country projects; 21% of this amount tagged to Oceania is the regional component of a multi-country project. However, some donors (e.g. Germany, France) report most of their funding as “regional” even when some of it is allocated to specific countries. This means the regional category also includes some country allocations within multi-country projects. Examples of this in the data include the European Union’s *Global Climate Change Alliance: Pacific Small Islands States (GCCA PSIS)* project, which includes nine dedicated country contributions, and GIZ’s *Adapting to Climate Change and Sustainable Energy (ACSE)* project, which includes 15 country allocations. For multi-country projects in which individual country allocations are reported separately by the donor, this finance data appears in the figures for the respective countries.

Figure 5 shows the distribution of climate finance among countries on a per capita basis. Overall, these per capita figures are substantially higher than for other regions of the world (OECD 2013). There may be several explanations for this. One is that the highly dispersed and isolated nature of Pacific Island countries means the costs of implementing projects and

programmes can be considerably higher, especially when outer islands are involved. Another is that the costs associated with preparing funding applications to the multilateral funds – which can be considerable (around US\$1 million per proposal for the Green Climate Fund) – are included in the climate finance figures reported to the OECD CRS. The scale of project preparation costs is the same whether the project is in Tuvalu or in China, meaning that *per capita*, these costs are much higher in the Pacific.

However, the data also reveals an interesting pattern about the success of the different island groupings of Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia in attracting climate-related finance. The Melanesian countries (PNG, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) are clustered at the lower end of the per capita scale for the region. This is primarily due to their larger population sizes, since the total funding figures in Figure 5 show these countries to be among the highest recipients across the Pacific. Polynesian countries (Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Niue and Tuvalu) are clustered at the upper end of the per capita scale for the Pacific, and have been distinctly more successful at attracting funding than the Micronesian countries (FSM, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Palau and Nauru). There is no significant difference in population sizes among countries within these groupings, which means population is unlikely to be a factor (except possibly in the case of Niue, which has distinctly fewer inhabitants than other countries included in this analysis).

Further reflection on why Polynesian countries have been more successful than Micronesian countries might help to draw out some useful lessons for the region as a whole – for instance, whether success is due to greater levels of preparedness or differences in administrative cultures (e.g. more comprehensive development or climate plans), different cultural approaches to negotiating with donors, strategic importance to donors, or other factors.

**Figure 5: Per capita climate finance by country and country group**




Note: Country components of regional projects where reporting was not separated by country are not included here. Population statistics taken from World Development Indicators (using total population 2014). The x-axis has no scale; it merely spreads out the different countries.

Another interesting difference among island groups is visible in the diversity of funding sources and uses. Again the Polynesian countries seem to have more sophisticated interaction with climate finance. Samoa has secured funding from nine different sources, including bilateral partners and dedicated climate funds (i.e. Climate Investment Funds,<sup>18</sup> the Adaptation Fund, and the GEF); whereas Palau is only working with funding from Australia, Japan and the GEF.

### 3.3 Distribution between adaptation and mitigation

About 59% (US\$441 million) of the total US\$748 million in climate finance supports adaptation to the impacts of climate change; 36% (US\$273 million), mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, and the remaining 5% (US\$34 million) targets both simultaneously. These proportions vary across countries, as shown in Figure 6. Samoa, Solomon Islands, FSM and Timor Leste, Solomon and Palau, for example, have been allocated greater amounts for adaptation, while the other Pacific Island countries have a greater portion of their funding focused on mitigation.

**Figure 6: Distribution of climate finance in each country by policy goal, 2010–2014**



Overall, there is no major difference between bilateral and multilateral sources in terms of the portions of climate finance allocated to adaptation vs. mitigation. Bilateral sources have directed 57% to adaptation, 37% to mitigation, and 6% to activities that target both simultaneously. Multilateral sources have directed 64% to adaptation and 36% to mitigation.

<sup>18</sup> Whereas other dedicated climate funds are accessible to a wide selection of countries, the Climate Investment Funds work on an invitation-only basis. From the Pacific, only Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tonga are Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) pilot countries, and Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Vanuatu are Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) pilot countries.

### 3.4 Distribution of finance by sector

Figure 7 shows the way climate finance has been distributed across sectors, for overall finance as well as broken down for activities identified as adaptation (Figure 7a) and mitigation (Figure 7b) respectively. This reveals:

- By far the largest single share of funding is categorized as supporting *enabling environments*.<sup>19</sup> This includes activities to mainstream climate change into sector policies, planning and management (including in the energy, forestry and water sectors). Examples include support for developing REDD+ strategies or for improving climate and weather data under the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Donors have indicated that this category is sometimes used even where the finance does go to a specific sector, but they find it difficult to identify which CRS sector code is most relevant. Therefore, it does not necessarily represent only policy and administrative support activities.
- Investments in *renewable energy* are the second most supported category.<sup>20</sup> These are mainly in solar energy, but also include wind projects in Samoa, geothermal in Vanuatu and biofuels in Timor Leste.
- *Research* includes projects focused mostly on understanding the impact of climate change on oceans and the possible impacts of this for the Pacific Islands.<sup>21</sup> The largest projects under this category are the Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific, the Pacific Sea Level Monitoring Project, and the Pacific-Australia Climate Change Science Adaptation Planning program.
- *Disaster prevention* includes support for cyclone shelters as well as the establishment of early warning systems, in particular for floods.<sup>22</sup>
- *Multi-sector aid* is used when the objective of the transaction corresponds to multiple sectors. Examples might include community-based projects where there are various different activities programmed as part of the same project.

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
<sup>19</sup> Enabling environments in this paper refers to the activities related to policy and administrative management in environment (code 41010), energy (23110), forestry (31210), water resources (14010), tourism (33210), public sector (15110), housing (16030) and fishing (31310).

<sup>20</sup> Renewable energy in this paper refers to the transactions classified under solar energy (code 23230); energy generation from multiple choices (23210); wind energy (23240); biofuel-fired power plants (23270) and geothermal energy (23260).


<sup>21</sup> Includes support to research and scientific institutions (43082), agricultural research (31182) and environmental research (41082).

<sup>22</sup> Includes flood prevention/control (41050) and disaster prevention and preparedness (74010).


**Figure 7: Climate finance to the Pacific Island countries by sector, 2010–2014**



**Figure 7a: Adaptation finance to the Pacific Island countries by sector, 2010–2014**






**Figure 7b: Mitigation finance to the Pacific Island countries by sector, 2010–2014**

In sectoral terms, there are noticeable differences in the character of bilateral and multilateral sources. As Figure 7c shows, bilateral sources exhibit significantly greater diversity in the use of funding. This is particularly the case in the use of adaptation funding, meaning a wider range of different sectors are receiving support. Multilateral sources display a bit more sectoral diversity in mitigation funding than they do in the use of adaptation funds, though even here there is still a much narrower range compared to bilateral sources. Multilateral funds use the category “multi-sector aid” in both adaptation and mitigation, which could be concealing some sectoral diversity, although in both cases the amounts are relatively small compared with overall total flows.


**Figure 7c: Comparison of sectoral spread in Pacific climate finance from bilateral and multilateral sources, 2010–2014**



### 3.5 Delivery of financial support

The vast majority (86%) of climate finance in the Pacific is being delivered through project-type interventions (which includes programmes of limited duration), while only a small fraction is channelled as direct budget support (1%) and sector budget support (1%). The category “other technical assistance” refers to technical assistance delivered outside of specific project envelopes, and includes support through research.


**Figure 8: Types of climate finance support provided to the Pacific Island countries, 2010–2014**



The heavy emphasis on project-based delivery is across the board, but Figure 8 also shows that bilateral sources report a greater diversity in types of aid when compared with multilateral sources. For bilateral sources this includes small portions of direct and sector budget support, and technical assistance outside projects. The budget support comes from the European Union’s European Development Fund and from Australia and the United Kingdom, and has gone to Samoa, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. Multilateral sources report only project-based finance, although care is needed when interpreting this. Climate funds sometimes provide a form of general “readiness support” or similar, which helps countries to strengthen administrative and planning systems and is therefore more akin to technical support than project-based finance. However, to date, this appears only within specific projects, and is likely linked to the planning or execution of those specific projects.

### 3.6 First recipient of funding

The CRS provides data on the first recipient of the funds. This is not necessarily the last recipient – in fact, that is rarely the case – but is typically some kind of implementing entity, an intermediary in the chain. According to the OECD (2016), it is the entity that has “implementing responsibility over the funds and is normally linked to the extending agency”. For example, the EU’s GCCA Pacific Small Island States (PSIS) project has the Secretary of the Pacific Community (SPC) as its first recipient. However, the last recipients of the funding include other regional organizations, like SPREP, and Ministries and other public offices within the nine recipient countries (see Figure 9).

**Figure 9: Example of a 'first recipient' in the GCCA Pacific Small Island States project**

Sources: Information from the GCCA website for sources of funding,<sup>23</sup> and from the project's evaluation report for the national implementing entities.<sup>24</sup>

Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify the final recipients of the finance from the CRS data, without reviewing individual project documents. However, this would be a valuable future exercise to give some insight into final beneficiaries of funding.

As shown in Figure 10, Pacific Island government entities are listed as the first recipient for only about 17% of the funds. By comparison, 33% of funds have an international organization (UN agency, multilateral development bank) as first recipient, and 16% are first received by an entity of the donor country's own government (e.g. the U.S. Agency for International Development, Korea International Cooperation Agency). For 7% of the funds, a "third country government" is listed as first recipient; that is all funding channelled from EU Member States via the European Development Fund (the first recipient), which then programmes the funding through regional organizations, research institutions, and so on. The 2% which goes first to regional organizations understates the role that regional organizations are playing in the use of climate finance, since a significant volume of the finance flows through these organizations as second or third recipients (e.g. both the EU and USAID programme funding through these organizations).


<sup>23</sup> See <http://www.gcca.eu/about-the-gcca/financial-resources>.

<sup>24</sup> See <http://ccprojects.gsd.spc.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/5.-Overall-GCCA-PSIS-Evaluation-Report-Final.pdf>.

The high reliance on intermediaries to programme and manage the funding implies transaction costs, which mean the total envelope of climate-related finance does not necessarily reach a country. Looking at the intermediaries also sheds light on which organizations have administrative control over the funding. Experience suggests that they have a high degree of influence over how the funding is used, as they are usually intimately involved in programme design and project formulation process.

Unfortunately, the CRS database does not provide data to track where funds go beyond the first recipient, i.e. which entities or types of organizations are the *ultimate* recipient of the funding, or even necessarily which are most involved in country-level programming.

**Figure 10: First recipients of climate finance to Pacific Island countries, 2010–2014 (figures are in million US\$)**



As Figure 10 shows, bilateral sources use a much more diverse array of “first recipients” of funding than multilateral sources. This is at least partly due to the fact that the newer climate funds use accredited implementing entities; as the data shows, as of 2014 these appear to have been only multilateral development banks or UN agencies.

Within the Pacific region, considerable emphasis is being placed by countries and regional organizations on accessing the multilateral climate funds, even though to date, they have been more burdensome and less significant funders than bilateral channels. The results presented here suggest that perhaps more effort and attention should be placed on using bilateral channels, especially since the transaction costs in doing so are considerably lower, and it is generally easier to connect the funds to wider development priorities.

At the same time, the contributions of multilateral sources will probably increase as the Green Climate Fund continues to scale up. The Pacific has already had two projects funded under the GCF – one for US\$31 million in Fiji and another for US\$36 million in Tuvalu – a scale that dwarfs the amounts coming for other individual projects. Over time, the effect may not be as large, since country allocations from the GCF are unlikely to be annual, but the scale of

funds will have a noticeable impact on the financial flow data. The role of multilateral climate funds is further discussed in Section 3.8.

### 3.7 Disbursement ratios

The total volumes reported above, and further explored in the sub-sections below, represent *committed* amounts, not the amounts actually disbursed at the time of donor reporting to the CRS database. Looking at disbursement data is useful, however, particularly in understanding whether there are challenges in actually implementing projects that have been approved.

As shown in Figure 11, about 66% of the flows committed for adaptation projects have been disbursed – US\$506 million); for mitigation projects, about 56% has been disbursed (US\$337 million), and for joint adaptation-mitigation projects, 84% (US\$333 million). Here we have included finance for which climate change is either a principal or significant objective, since it is useful when looking for any broader patterns relating to disbursement challenges.


However, disbursement figures can be difficult to interpret for various reasons:

- Some of the difference between commitment amounts and disbursements is a data gap. For example, some donors or funds (such as the GEF) don't report on disbursement, and therefore the figures are an underestimate of actual disbursement.
- Another part of the difference is due to project implementation schedules. For multi-year projects (which is basically everything), some amounts committed in one year are intended to be disbursed in a later year, as the project rolls out. Thus, there will always be some gap between commitments and disbursements, and the disbursements reported over the 2010–2014 period may not exactly match commitments (indeed, funds disbursed in that period might have been committed in previous years).

In addition to the above technical reasons for the observed differences, the gaps also undoubtedly reflect some difficulties with implementing projects and thus disbursing funds. There are examples of country allocations being withdrawn because of implementation problems (e.g. within the EU's GCCA PSIS project). For some of these cases, the approved funding may have been reallocated to another country (if part of a regional program or project), while for some others the funds may not have been reallocated (e.g. they may have been reabsorbed by bilateral donors and/or used for new approvals in subsequent years). It is unclear whether implementation challenges are likely to be any more or less significant for climate change projects compared to broader development projects.



**Figure 11: Comparison of commitments and disbursements of climate-related finance to Pacific Island countries, 2010–2014**



The figure shows that for Marshall Islands, Nauru and FSM, disbursements were actually greater than committed amounts. Given the relatively small scale of the portfolios in some of the countries in the Pacific, a time lag between commitments and expenditure in one or two projects can make total disbursements higher than commitments for the period under analysis.

A significant difference in disbursement ratios is visible between bilateral and multilateral sources. Over the 2010–2014 period, bilateral sources disbursed around 76% of the volume of funds committed in the same period, while multilateral sources reached only 8% disbursement. The bulk of the disbursement reported for multilateral sources comes from the Adaptation Fund. The low figure of 8% can partly be explained by the fact that the GEF, responsible for 62% of the reported multilateral flows, does not report disbursements to the CRS. However, the data also probably reflects real delays in the disbursement of the Climate Investment Funds (specifically the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience), which had a global average disbursement rate of 8% between 2011 and 2014 (Climate Investment Funds 2015).<sup>25</sup>

### 3.8 Multilateral climate funds

Here we focus specifically on understanding what activities the various multilateral climate funds have been supporting in the Pacific. The main data, above, includes the activities of the various funds for the period 2010–2014, but for the climate funds we are able to extend the period of coverage until September 2016 because more recent data on these funds is available in the Climate Funds Update database. It is thus instructive to review the scale and type of

<sup>25</sup> Note that the disbursement numbers are different in the CRS than in the PPCR results report as of 31 December 2014.

contributions that these funds have been making over the last two years, since some have been scaling up activity.

In the period 2010–2014, the multilateral climate funds contributed about US\$210 million (28%) of the committed US\$748 million in finance principally targeting climate change in the Pacific region. When the analysis is extended to September 2016, total approvals for the Pacific were US\$347 million between the beginning of 2010 and September 2016, according to Climate Funds Update. The allocations made by each fund are listed in Table 1.

**Table 1: Allocations by multilateral climate funds between January 2010 and September 2016**


Fund	Countries with projects approved 2010–2016	Total funding 2010–2016	Comments
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)	Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, Tuvalu and Vanuatu	US\$90 million	LDCF is focused on adaptation and is available for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) only
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, FSM, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, Tonga and Tuvalu	US\$27 million	Funding focused on renewable energy and energy efficiency, in addition to small grants for UNFCCC reporting (i.e. national communications)
Adaptation Fund	Cook Islands, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands	US\$26 million	Focused on adaptation; open to all Kyoto Protocol Parties; there is currently a US\$10 million ceiling per country
Green Climate Fund (GCF)	Fiji and Tuvalu (full project approvals) Cook Islands, FSM and Vanuatu (readiness support)	US\$68 million	Given the readiness support, further approvals are expected in the near future for Cook Islands, FSM and Vanuatu
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)	PNG, Samoa, Tonga	US\$81 million	Countries participate by invitation only, based on the fund's assessment
Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries (SREP)	Solomon Islands, Vanuatu	US\$14 million	Countries participate by invitation only, based on the fund's assessment
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)	Fiji, PNG, Vanuatu	US \$11 million	Funding is for supporting REDD+ readiness process; this fund is reported as a bilateral program in the CRS
UN Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)	PNG, Solomon Islands	US \$7 million	Funding is to support the design and implementation of UN REDD programmes; this fund is reported as a bilateral programme in the CRS

The largest allocations come from the GCF (US\$31 million in Fiji and US\$36 million in Tuvalu) and from the PPCR (US\$25 million in PNG, US\$36 million in Samoa, and US\$20 million in Tonga). Given the scale of the Green Climate Fund, and the size of the early allocations to Fiji and Tuvalu, multilaterals may show up as channelling a more significant share of total flows in future. The scale of the GCF and its need to allocate large volumes will

also likely have impacts on what funds are being used for – the two cases so far are for large infrastructure projects.

Figure 12 shows the provision of funding from the multilateral climate funds, with a breakdown of the use of funding by sector.

**Figure 12: Pacific climate finance from the multilateral climate funds (commitments, in US\$ million)**



Some funds report on “co-financing”, in addition to the amounts reported through the CRS, suggesting that the funds are mobilizing much larger amounts of project funding for countries. However, significant caution is needed in interpreting those co-financing figures. For instance, the GCF website reports co-funding of 86% for the Fiji project (meaning that the GCF component was 14% of total project costs).<sup>26</sup> In this case, the GCF’s grant is for a small component of a larger water infrastructure project, and the other components of the project are not motivated by climate change. Further, the other project funding was already in place prior to the GCF being involved, so the fact that it is reported as co-financing should not be misinterpreted as the GCF allocation having catalysed the rest of the finance.

### 3.9 Limitations in the data

The data presented above is useful in helping to identify broad patterns across the Pacific. However, it needs to be interpreted with some caution, particularly when looking at finer details.

First, the data is derived solely from how donors themselves report their use of ODA in the Pacific region. None of the data is independently verified, which means we do not know whether it actually reflects climate outcomes on the ground. We also do not know the quality of the outcomes being generated (a limitation of ODA and climate finance data in general, as

<sup>26</sup> Accessed on 10 November 2016 at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/-/fiji-urban-water-supply-and-wastewater-management-project?inheritRedirect=true&redirect=%2Fprojects%2Fbrowse-projects>.

there has been no systematic, long-term evaluation of the impacts of these financial flows). In addition, it is unclear to what extent the funded activities connect to or align with the highest priorities of Pacific Island countries.

Second, a closer review of individual examples reveals that there are some obvious errors in the tagging process. For example:

- Two LDCF projects have been classified as mitigation projects, with no adaptation marker, even though the LDCF is a fund for adaptation.
- The category “environmental policy and admin management” is broad, and conversations with donors suggest it is sometimes used because funding is not always easy to tag to specific sector codes in the CRS. Some finance in this general category thus goes to specific sectors or policy objectives, such as food security (e.g. the “Enhancing national food security in the context of global climate change” project in Kiribati) or disaster risk reduction (e.g. “Strengthening community resilience to climate induced natural disasters in the Dili to Ainaro Road development corridor” in Timor Leste). Similarly, some sectoral allocations are subsumed under the category “multi-sector aid”. Examples here include regional community-based grants project funded by Australia, the PPCR share of an adaptation project in Tonga, and the Ridge to Reef project in Fiji funded through the GEF.
- Some disaster risk reduction projects have been tagged as supporting mitigation, suggesting that although the tag is meant to be used for greenhouse gas reduction projects, the donor (mis)applied the term to disaster risk.
- There are many examples where the relationship between the title of the activity and the sector are unclear. For example, allocations that seem to support political representation at UN climate change conferences or other high-level meetings have been tagged as supporting the biodiversity sector.

Still, the CRS data is helpful in that it provides a useful overview of regional patterns in the mobilization and spending of climate finance. In Section 4, we discuss ways to improve the data going forward, since transparent, reliable and timely data is crucial for informed decision-making by Pacific Island stakeholders.

#### **4. SYNTHESIS AND NEXT STEPS**

The analysis reveals that a total of US\$748 million in ODA principally targeting climate change objectives was committed to Pacific Island countries in 2010–2014. These figures, including the country-specific data in the Annex, differ markedly from the numbers shown in the Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIRs) and Pacific Climate Change Finance Assessments (PCCFAs) produced so far.

For example, analysis of climate-relevant finance in the Marshall Islands (PIFS 2014) identified about 40 climate-related projects totalling US\$34 million. This figure was arrived at after the authors weighted different contributions based on their assessment of climate relevance, and the report notes that “these funds are not always obviously recognisable as climate change finance, since the primary objective may relate to, for instance, security for water, energy, food and so on” (p.10). By comparison, data in the CRS identifies only US\$7.9 million over the period 2010–2014, and a very different spread of contributions from different sources. One reason for the difference is that the PCCFA includes some financial flows where climate change was not the main objective, whereas in this analysis we have focused only on

flows that have climate change as their primary purpose. However, there may be other reasons too for the difference, and this would be worth further exploring in order to better understand the data from both the CRS and the country studies.

From the array of data presented in Section 3, a few patterns are worth highlighting. One, already mentioned, is that the Polynesian islands have been noticeably more successful at attracting climate finance than similarly populated Micronesian countries. This is evident in both the totals and in per capita figures. Generally the Polynesian countries have also attracted a greater diversity of funding sources, and they have connected funding with a wider range of sectors. The reasons for this pattern are not immediately clear, nor are they explored in this paper, but they warrant further consideration. They could provide useful lessons to help all Pacific Island countries in their future efforts to access funding.

We also noticed that some sectors, such as health or education, do not appear in the data at all, even though they are likely to be critical for building long-term resilience, and are also core components of countries' national development agendas. There are three plausible explanations: either (a) some sectors have been more successful than others at making a case for being "climate-relevant", even though in reality, a very wide range of sectors are likely to play a role in building resilience; (b) because finance is delivered through intermediaries that are then charged with programming the funds, finance is skewed towards sectors in which those intermediaries have expertise or convening power; and/or (c) because our analysis focused on finance that targets climate change primarily, it misses support for these sectors that is not coded as primarily for climate objectives, but rather as having climate co-benefits. Whichever the reason, the pattern in sectoral distribution should provoke some reflection on how climate finance is being used by countries and their support organizations.

Another observation relates to differences in the character of bilateral and multilateral funding channels. Bilateral channels appear to work with a greater variety of "first recipients", have programmed into a wider range of sectors, and have used delivery mechanisms other than project-based finance, such as budget support (even though project-based delivery is still the main way of operating). Although not obvious from the data presented here, there are also significantly lower transaction costs associated with accessing bilateral finance, compared with the multilateral funds. Funds such as the GEF and more recently the GCF have also defined more narrowly how funding can be used. At the same time, as the GCF ramps up, it is likely that the scale of individual allocations will also increase – as evident in the early GCF grants to Fiji (US\$31 million) and Tuvalu (US\$36 million). The scale of financial support will also likely have an effect on the types of activities that are funded, and may, for instance, result in a larger share of funding going to infrastructure projects with high capital costs.

Exploring the differences between bilateral and multilateral sources may shed light on how well climate finance is able to connect with countries' overall development priorities. In this regard, bilateral sources appear to provide considerably more flexibility in scope, and thus potentially more opportunities to find synergies between climate and development goals. In the long term, flexibility is likely to be important for countries trying to build resilience to a range of future uncertainties and challenges (including climate change) simultaneously.

One thing we cannot see in the data is how much money has been spent helping countries prepare to access funds. In the case of the multilateral funds, these costs can be very high (Fiji's proposal to the Green Climate Fund, for example, cost about US\$1 million and took a year to prepare). Assessing the functioning of the climate finance regime internationally also requires consideration of the burdens that these processes place on recipient countries.

There are other flows of climate-relevant finance, in particular from multilateral development banks (MDBs), that are not reported to the CRS and are thus not included in this analysis. Globally, MDBs report contributing US\$523 million in climate finance to SIDS in 2015 alone (Multilateral Development Banks 2016), which is an order of magnitude above the figures revealed by the CRS analysis for the entire 2010–2014 period. The main reason for such a large difference in scale is likely to be that the MDBs include non-grant finance in their report: lending makes up 75% of their portfolio (approaching 85% when policy loans and lines of credit are included), while grants make up only 6%, or US\$1,430 million globally in 2015. Allocations to the Pacific are not reported separately from those to East Asia, so a regional breakdown is not possible. However, MDBs report having provided climate finance to all Pacific countries included in this study, with the exception of Niue. The sector receiving the largest amount in the Pacific is classified as “energy, transport and other built environment and infrastructure”.

#### 4.1 Going forward

Pacific Island governments and regional support organizations need transparent, reliable, comprehensive climate finance data to make informed decisions. Countries need to be able to analyse finance flows over time, and evaluate not only *how much* money is flowing, but also – most important – *what it is being used for*, and how that compares with their own climate and development priorities. Ideally, data should be available in a form that country officers can interrogate, with their own queries.

There have been many improvements in the presentation of data by the CRS in recent years. However, for countries with typically small public services and sometimes no data specialists, training may be required in using the database, so it can become a more valuable tool for the region. Speeding up the process of donor reporting would also make the CRS more useful for countries, since at present there are considerable time lags in the reporting process. Beyond the CRS, it would also help if international/global reporting by research institutions, development finance institutions and funds began to separate the Pacific region from Asia, so that the much smaller Pacific component becomes visible.

The CRS data is essentially how funders are reporting climate finance to Pacific Island countries, rather than an assessment of climate relevance made by the recipients themselves. Over time, as recipient countries develop more comprehensive oversight of incoming climate finance and more sophisticated systems for tracking and managing these flows, it may become possible to compare “top-down” reports from funders with “bottom-up” reports from countries, enabling a more productive dialogue about how climate finance is working.

Finally, in parallel with getting a better view of how much finance is flowing, we should start to ask questions about the *quality* of spending. To do so, countries and supporting regional organizations need some framework to help them think about the quality and longevity of the outcomes being produced in the Pacific Islands. The research community might play a useful role here, working with countries to help develop such frameworks. The ultimate goal against which climate finance needs to be measured is whether it is making a significant difference in the resilience of the social, economic and environmental systems upon which the Pacific Islands depend for a secure, prosperous future.



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## ANNEX: COUNTRY DATA ANALYSIS


### A.1 Cook Islands

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$31.4 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to the Cook Islands for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$30 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$31.4 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, about 68% (US\$21.4 million) supported mitigation activities, about 32% (US\$9.9 million) was for adaptation and 0.1% (US\$0.03 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.<sup>27</sup>

The largest single sources of climate finance for the Cook Islands were New Zealand, the Adaptation Fund and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). New Zealand has mainly financed solar energy projects, while the Adaptation Fund has focused mainly on disaster prevention and preparedness, and the GEF on biodiversity activities. These are also the sectors that have received the largest allocations overall.

**Figure A1: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Cook Islands (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective

<sup>27</sup> Totals here and in other annexes may not add up perfectly due to rounding.

In addition, data on multilateral climate fund activities show that between January 2015 and September 2016, US\$4.3 million has been allocated to Cook Islands: US\$150,000 from the Green Climate Fund, as part of its readiness programme support; and US\$4.13 million from the GEF for a renewable energy project.

Table A1 lists individual climate finance contributions to Cook Islands in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A1: Climate finance commitments to the Cook Islands, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source	Project/Intervention title	Sector	Amount
<b>Adaptation Fund</b>	Resilience of Climate Change	Disaster prevention and preparedness	5.38
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change Project	Environmental policy	1.03
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Islands Climate Prediction Phase 2	Environmental policy	0.03
<b>Australia</b>	Secretariat of the Pacific Community Climate Change Activities	Environmental policy	0.03
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.64
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager, January–June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>EU Institutions</b>	Building resilience to natural disasters	Disaster prevention and preparedness	1.26
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	R2R: Conserving Biodiversity and Enhancing Ecosystem Functions through a "Ridge to Reef" Approach	Bio-diversity	4.42
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Energy generation-renewable	0.00
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Public policy	0.00
<b>Korea</b>	PIF Special Training on Climate Change	Environmental policy	0.02
<b>New Zealand</b>	Cyclone Recovery Programme Technical Assistance	Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation	0.08
<b>New Zealand</b>	Renewable Energy (Northern Group)	Solar energy	17.00
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>31.37</b>


### A.2 Fiji

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$32 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Fiji for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$20 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$32.3 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, about 61% (US\$19.8 million) supported mitigation activities, about 38% (US\$12.4 million) was for adaptation, and less than 1% (US\$0.1 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The largest single sources of climate finance for Fiji were the United Arab Emirates, Japan and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). UAE has mainly financed solar energy projects, Japan has supported disaster prevention and preparedness activities, and the GEF’s activities have mainly been coded as “multi-sectoral”. These three sectors have also received the largest overall allocations.

**Figure A2: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Fiji (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

In addition, data on multilateral climate fund activities show that between January 2015 and September 2016 Fiji was allocated US\$31 million from the Green Climate Fund, for a water

supply project in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank, and US\$ 3.8 million from the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, for REDD+ readiness.

Table A2 lists individual climate finance contributions to Fiji in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A2: Climate finance commitments to Fiji, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source	Project/intervention title	Sector	Amount
Australia	Enhancing CCA in rural communities in Fiji	Environmental policy	0.74
Australia	Millennium Development Goal Carbon Facility for Sustainable Development	Environmental policy	0.34
Australia	Pacific Islands Climate Prediction Phase 2	Environmental policy	0.03
Australia	Secretariat of the Pacific Community Climate Change Activities	Environmental policy	0.01
Australia	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
Australia	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.64
Australia	Engagement of COSPPac Manager January – June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
Australia	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
Australia	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
Australia	Climate Change Implications Taro/Cassava	Food crop production	0.12
Australia	Understanding the responses of taro and cassava to climate change	Food crop production	0.07
Germany	Community Based Marine Resource Management and Climate Change Impact Preparedness	Biosphere protection	0.54
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	PAS Fiji Renewable Energy Power Project (FREPP)	Energy policy	1.00
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	Capacity Building for Mainstreaming MEA Objectives into Inter-ministerial Structures and Mechanisms	Environmental policy	0.64
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	R2R: Implementing a "Ridge to Reef" Approach to Preserve Ecosystem Services, Sequester Carbon, Improve Climate Resilience and Sustain Livelihoods	Multisector aid	7.64
Japan	Disaster prevention and preparedness	Disaster prevention and preparedness	1.45
Japan	TC aggregated activities	Disaster prevention and preparedness	1.12
Japan	The Project for Improvement of Equipment for Disaster Risk Management	Disaster prevention and preparedness	3.76
Japan	TC aggregated activities	Energy policy	0.01
Japan	TC aggregated activities	Environmental policy	0.01
Japan	TC aggregated activities	Forestry policy	0.54
Japan	TC aggregated activities	River basins development	2.36
Japan	TC aggregated activities	Social/welfare services	0.09
Korea	Analysis of COMS Data	Technical	0.01
Korea	Climate Change and Disaster Prevention	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.01



Source	Project/intervention title	Sector	Amount
Korea	Disaster Prediction and Warning System	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.01
Korea	Ocean Observation and Hydrographic Surveying	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.01
Korea	PIF Special Training on Climate Change	Environmental policy	0.05
Korea	Analysis of COMS(Communication, Ocean, Meteorological Satellite) Data (for Asian Pacific Countries)	Public policy	0.02
Korea	KOICA-ESCAP Capacity Building Programme on Space Technology and GIS	Rural development	0.03
Korea	Analysis of COMS(Communication, Ocean, Meteorological Satellite) Data	Telecommunications	0.02
Korea	Water Resources Management for Responding to Climate Change	Water resources protection	0.01
United Arab Emirates	Design, supply and install 500 kW micro grid-connected PV plant (funded by ADFD)	Solar energy	5.00
United Arab Emirates	Solar Power Projects (525 KW)	Solar energy	4.39
United Kingdom	Water pump for Lololo Primary School	Basic drinking water supply	0.00
United Kingdom	Pacific Climate Change Workshop	Bio-diversity	0.01
United Kingdom	Pacific Climate Change Leadership Workshop to raise awareness on climate change with a specific focus on capacity building and developing leadership in the area of climate change in the Pacific	Bio-diversity	0.01
United Kingdom	Strengthening National Governance of Climate Adaption in the Pacific Region	Bio-diversity	0.03
United Kingdom	Fiji delegation to UNFCCC	Environmental policy	0.01
United Kingdom	Pacific Climate Change Workshop	Environmental policy	0.00
United Kingdom	SPREP Media Outreach	Environmental policy	0.00
United Kingdom	Strengthening National Governance of Climate Adaption in the Pacific Region	Environmental policy	0.02
United Kingdom	Fiji Floods Disaster Relief	Relief assistance and services	0.03
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>32.26</b>


### A.3 Federated States of Micronesia

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$ 3.93 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$2.16 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$3.93 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 0.4% (US\$0.014 million) supported mitigation activities, while 99.4% (US\$3.91 million) was for adaptation, and 0.2% (0.008 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

By far the largest single source of climate finance for FSM was Australia. The sectors that have received the largest overall allocations are disaster prevention and preparedness and environmental research.

**Figure A3: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, FSM (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

In addition, data on multilateral climate fund activities show that between January 2015 and September 2016, FSM was allocated US\$0.3 million for readiness support from the Green Climate Fund, and US\$0.85 million from the Global Environment Facility to support the development of its Third National Communication and First Biennial Update Report.

Table A3 lists individual climate finance contributions to FSM in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A3: Climate finance commitments to FSM, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

<b>Source</b>	<b>Project/intervention title</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Amount</b>
<b>Australia</b>	CADRE Program	Disaster prevention and preparedness	1.04
<b>Australia</b>	Climate Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction and Education Program	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.93
<b>Australia</b>	Secretariat of the Pacific Community Climate Change Activities	Environmental policy	0.17
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.26
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager January – June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	R2R – Pacific Islands Ridge-to-Reef National Priorities – Integrated Water, Land, Forest and Coastal Management	Environmental policy	0.00
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Energy policy	0.01
<b>United States</b>	Small Project Assistance (SPA) Program with Peace Corps – Capacity Building, Preparedness and Planning	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.04
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>3.93</b>


### A.4 Kiribati

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$30.5 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Kiribati for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$81.7 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$30.5 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 52.1% (US\$15.9 million) supported mitigation activities, 43.3% (US\$13.2 million) was for adaptation, and 4.5% (US\$ 1.4 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The largest single sources of climate finance for Kiribati were Australia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Global Environment Facility (through its Trust Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund). Australia and the GEF have mainly financed activities categorized as “environmental policy”, while Australia has also funded environmental research. The UAE’s contributions are concentrated on solar energy. Overall, these are also the sectors that have received the largest allocations.

**Figure A4: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Kiribati (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

Table A4 lists individual climate finance contributions to Kiribati in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A4: Climate finance commitments to Kiribati, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source	Project/intervention title	Sector	Amount
<b>Australia</b>	Extension of KAP II	Environmental policy	0.57
<b>Australia</b>	Feasibility study on Establishing DRM fund	Environmental policy	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)	Environmental policy	0.14
<b>Australia</b>	Kiribati Adaptation Project Phase III (KAP-III)	Environmental policy	5.26
<b>Australia</b>	OB Office Extension	Environmental policy	0.41
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Islands Climate Prediction Phase 2	Environmental policy	0.06
<b>Australia</b>	Secretariat of the Pacific Community Climate Change Activities	Environmental policy	0.16
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Support to Public Utilities Board (PUB)	Environmental policy	0.42
<b>Australia</b>	Tarawa Climate Change Conference Technical Adviser	Environmental policy	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Tarawa National Climate Change Consultation	Environmental policy	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.83
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager January – June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>Australia</b>	Community-based Climate Change Action Grants	Multi-sector aid	0.36
<b>Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)</b>	Enhancing National Food Security in the Context of Global Climate Change	Environmental policy	4.57
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	R2R Resilient Islands, Resilient Communities	Environmental policy	4.87
<b>GEF</b>	Integrating Global Environmental Priorities into National Policies and Programmes	Public policy	0.52
<b>GEF</b>	Grid Connected Solar PV Central Station Project	Solar energy	1.00
<b>Italy</b>	Memorandum of Understanding – Kiribati Islands – Joint Committee (JC7)	Energy generation – renewable	0.27
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Water Supply for Banaba Island	Basic drinking water supply	0.15
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Energy generation – renewable	0.00
<b>Korea</b>	PIF Special Training on Climate Change	Environmental policy	0.01
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	Design, supply and install 500 kW micro grid-connected PV plant. (Funded by ADFD)	Solar energy	5.00
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	Solar Power Projects (400 kW)	Solar energy	4.39
<b>United Kingdom</b>	President Tong contributes to pressure on major industrial countries to take on mitigation and MRV responsibilities at Cancun COP16	Biodiversity	0.01
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Workshop to raise awareness on climate change, with a specific focus on capacity building and developing leadership in the area of climate change in the Pacific	Biodiversity	0.00
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>30.52</b>


### A.5 Nauru

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$5.4 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Nauru for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$2.7 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$5.4 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 50.7% (US\$2.7 million) supported mitigation activities, 36.1% (US\$1.9 million) was for adaptation, and 13.2% (0.7 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The largest single sources of climate finance for Nauru were the Global Environment Facility (GEF), Australia and the European Union. The GEF contributions focused on biodiversity activities, Australia’s mainly on environmental research, and the EU’s on disaster prevention and preparedness. Overall, these three sectors have received the largest allocations.

**Figure A5: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Nauru (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

Table A5 lists individual climate finance contributions to Nauru in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A5: Climate finance commitments to Nauru, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

<b>Source</b>	<b>Project/intervention title</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Amount</b>
<b>Australia</b>	Secretariat of the Pacific Community Climate Change Activities	Environmental policy	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.26
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager, January–June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>EU Institutions</b>	Disaster Risk Reduction in Eight Pacific ACP States	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.70
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	R2R: Implementing a "Ridge to Reef" Approach to Protecting Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functions in Nauru (R2R Nauru)	Bio-diversity	2.73
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Upgrading of Water Supply System in Eastern Communities of Nauru	Basic drinking water supply	0.10
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Upgrading of Water Supply System in Northern Communities of Nauru	Basic drinking water supply	0.10
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Energy generation-renewable	0.01
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Public policy	0.00
<b>Korea</b>	PIF Special Training on Climate Change	Environmental policy	0.01
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>5.40</b>



## A.6 Niue

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$7.4 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Niue for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$20.9 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$7.4 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 56.7% (US\$4.17 million) supported mitigation activities, 43.2% (US\$3.18 million) was for adaptation, and 0.1% (US\$0.01 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The largest single contribution to Niue’s climate finance has come from the Global Environment Facility, while the other contributions are sourced from Australia. Finance has been categorized as for “environmental policy” and for environmental research.

**Figure A6: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Niue (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

Table A6 lists individual climate finance contributions to Niue in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A6: Climate finance commitments to Niue, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

<b>Source</b>	<b>Project/intervention title</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Amount</b>
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change Project	Environmental policy	1.03
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Islands Climate Prediction Phase 2	Environmental policy	0.03
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.64
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager, January–June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	R2R – Pacific Islands Ridge-to-Reef National Priorities – Integrated Water, Land, Forest and Coastal Management	Environmental policy	4.17
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>7.36</b>


## A.7 Palau

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$6.2 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Palau for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$28.2 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$6.2 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 45% (US\$2.8 million) supported mitigation activities, 55% (US\$3.4 million) was for adaptation, and US\$0.01 million targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The sources of climate finance for Palau were the Global Environment Facility (GEF), Australia and Japan. The GEF has mainly provided its support for environmental policy, Australia for environmental research, and Japan mainly for biodiversity activities.

**Figure A7: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Palau (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

Table A7 lists individual climate finance contributions to Palau in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A7: Climate finance commitments to Palau, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source	Project/intervention title	Sector	Amount
<b>Australia</b>	Secretariat of the Pacific Community Climate Change Activities	Environmental policy	0.04
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.26
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager, January–June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	Mainstreaming Global Environmental Priorities into National Policies and Programmes	Environmental policy	0.58
<b>GEF</b>	R2R- Pacific Islands Ridge-to-Reef National Priorities – Integrated Water, Land, Forest and Coastal Management	Environmental policy	2.22
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Biodiversity	1.61
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Energy policy	0.01
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>6.20</b>


### A.8 Papua New Guinea

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$41.4 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Papua New Guinea for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$147.4 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$41.4 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 60.6% (US\$25.1 million) supported mitigation activities, 34.9% (US\$14.4 million) was for adaptation, and 4.6% (US\$1.9 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The largest single sources of climate finance for Papua New Guinea were Australia, Japan, the European Union and the Adaptation Fund. Australia and Japan have funded mainly “environmental policy”, with further contributions to environmental research and forestry policy, while the EU has focused on forestry education and training, and the Adaptation Fund has allocated finance for flood prevention and control.

**Figure A8: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, PNG (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

In addition, data on multilateral climate fund activities show that between January 2015 and September 2016, Papua New Guinea was allocated US\$25 million from the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, to build resilience through climate change and vulnerability assessments, promote sustainable fishery ecosystems and food security, and develop sustainable coastal

infrastructure; US\$2.84 million from the Global Environment Facility for a project on renewable energy and energy efficiency; and a US\$3.8 million REDD readiness preparation grant from the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility.

Table A8 lists individual climate finance contributions to PNG in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A8: Climate finance commitments to PNG, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source	Project/intervention title	Sector	Amount
<b>Adaptation Fund</b>	Adaptive capacity in the North Coast and Islands Region	Flood prevention/control	6.53
<b>Australia</b>	Natural Hazard Risk Assessment Mapping Activity	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.52
<b>Australia</b>	Community-Based Adaptation activities	Environmental policy	1.55
<b>Australia</b>	Early action	Environmental policy	3.06
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Islands Climate Prediction Phase 2	Environmental policy	0.03
<b>Australia</b>	PNG Climate Change Adaptation Activities	Environmental policy	3.08
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Support for Coral Triangle Initiative – Second Phase	Environmental policy	0.32
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.81
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager January – June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>Australia</b>	Early action	Forestry policy	0.09
<b>Australia</b>	Community-based Climate Change Action Grants	Multi-sector aid	1.85
<b>Canada</b>	Support to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility's Readiness Fund / Appui au Fonds de préparation du Fonds de partenariat pour le carbone forestier	Forestry policy	1.09
<b>EU Institutions</b>	GCCA – Technical support to the Papua New Guinea Forest Authority to implement a continuous and multi-purpose national forest inventory	Forestry education/training	7.71
<b>Germany</b>	Model Management Payment for Environmental Service	Forestry development	0.39
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	PNG Energy Development Project	Energy policy	0.91
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	Strengthening Capacities to Measure, Report and Verify Indicators of Global Environment Benefits	Environmental policy	0.53
<b>Japan</b>	The Forest Preservation Programme	Environmental policy	7.98
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Forestry policy	2.44
<b>Korea</b>	Analysis of COMS Data	Technical training	0.01
<b>Korea</b>	Climate Change and Disaster Prevention	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.01
<b>Korea</b>	KOICA-JICA Joint Training Program on Awareness of Disaster Reduction	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.00

<b>Source</b>	<b>Project/intervention title</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Amount</b>
<b>Korea</b>	Ocean Observation and Hydrographic Surveying	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.01
<b>Korea</b>	PIF Special Training on Climate Change	Environmental policy	0.03
<b>Korea</b>	Professional Capacity Building for Ecosystems Management	Environmental policy	0.02
<b>Korea</b>	Analysis of COMS(Communication, Ocean, Meteorological Satellite) Data (for Asian Pacific Countries)	Public sector policy	0.03
<b>Korea</b>	Water Resources Management for Responding to Climate Change	Water resources protection	0.01
<b>New Zealand</b>	Community based Adaptation, PNG Rural	Environmental policy and admin. management	0.00
<b>Norway</b>	EMIS Community mobilization to defend natural resources	Democratic participation and civil society	0.11
<b>Norway</b>	Protect the environment & indigenous rights	Democratic participation and civil society	0.12
<b>Norway</b>	FPCD Community Initiative on Climate Change and Forestry – CFI 2010-2012	Environmental policy and admin. management	0.50
<b>Spain</b>	UN-REDD – Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation	Biosphere protection	0.15
<b>United Kingdom</b>	CSW Seminar in New York	Environmental education/training	0.00
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>41.36</b>




### A.9 Republic of the Marshall Islands

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$7.9 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to the Republic of the Marshall Islands for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$6.5 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$7.9 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 50.8% (US\$4 million) supported mitigation activities, 44.4% (US\$3.5 million) was for adaptation, and 4.8% (US\$0.4 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The largest single sources of climate finance for Marshall Islands was the Global Environment Facility (GEF), followed by Australia. The GEF has mainly financed projects categorized as “environmental policy”, while Australia has spread its contributions across environmental research, disaster prevention and preparedness, and drinking water supply. Overall, these are also the sectors that have received the largest allocations.

**Figure A9: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Marshall Islands (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

Table A9 lists individual climate finance contributions to Marshall Islands in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A9: Climate finance commitments to Marshall Islands, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source	Project/intervention title	Sector	Amount
<b>Australia</b>	Ebeye Water Catchment Tanks	Basic drinking water supply	0.46
<b>Australia</b>	CADRE Program	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.52
<b>Australia</b>	Climate Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction and Education Program	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.47
<b>Australia</b>	Secretariat of the Pacific Community Climate Change Activities	Environmental policy	0.08
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.26
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager, January–June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>Australia</b>	Community-based Climate Change Action Grants	Multisector aid	0.36
<b>Canada</b>	Republic of the Marshall Islands solar powered streetlight project	Solar energy	0.10
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	R2R- Pacific Islands Ridge-to-Reef National Priorities – Integrated Water, Land, Forest and Coastal Management	Environmental policy and admin. management	3.92
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Energy policy and administrative management	0.01
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Climate Change Resources in Marshall Islands and UK Outreach	Biodiversity	0.01
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Climate Change Resources for the Marshall Islands and UK Outreach	Environmental policy	0.00
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Climate Change Resources in Marshall Islands and UK Outreach	Environmental policy	0.01
<b>United States</b>	Marshall Islands Climate Advisor	Biosphere protection	0.16
<b>United States</b>	Adaptation: Funds Transfer to Embassy Post Marshall Islands for GCC Advisor: Adaptation	Environmental policy and admin. management	0.10
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>7.93</b>


**A.10 Samoa**

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$98.2 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Samoa for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$55.9 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$98.2 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 30% (US\$29.5 million) supported mitigation activities, 68.5% (US\$67.2 million) was for adaptation, and 1.5% (US\$1.5 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

Samoa has benefited from a considerable diversity in funding sources, the largest contributions coming from the Climate Investment Funds and the Global Environment Facility, followed by New Zealand, Japan and the United Arab Emirates. Samoa has also been allocated a grant from the Adaptation Fund. Overall, the sectors that have received the largest allocations are “environmental policy”, renewable energy (including wind and solar), road transport, and “multi-sector aid”. Disaster prevention and preparedness and water policy are the next-largest recipient sectors.

**Figure A10: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Samoa (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

In addition, data on multilateral climate fund activities show that between January 2015 and September 2016, Samoa was allocated US\$6.1 million from the Global Environment Facility for a project to improve the performance and reliability of renewable energy systems.

Table A10 lists individual climate finance contributions to Samoa in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A10: Climate finance commitments to Samoa, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source	Project/intervention title	Sector	Amount
<b>Adaptation Fund</b>	Enhancing Resilience of Coastal Communities	Environmental policy	8.73
<b>Australia</b>	Inclusive Education Additional Small Grants	Democratic participation and civil society	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Appliance Labelling and Standards Program	Energy policy	1.04
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Islands Climate Prediction Phase 2	Environmental policy	0.05
<b>Australia</b>	Redevelopment Mission	Environmental policy	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Samoa NAPA4 Support	Environmental policy	1.24
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.64
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager, January–June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>Australia</b>	Redevelopment Mission	Forestry policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Samoa Agro-Forestry and Tree Farming Program	Forestry policy	0.76
<b>Australia</b>	Long Term Technical Advisers-Law & Justice Sector	Legal and judicial development	0.28
<b>Climate Investment Funds (CIF)</b>	Enhancing the Climate Resilience of Coastal Resources and Communities	Environmental policy	14.96
<b>CIF</b>	Enhancing the Climate Resilience of the West Coast Road(Apia to Airport)	Road transport	14.93
<b>EU Institutions</b>	Global Climate Change Alliance: Supporting Climate Change Adaption for the Samoan Water Sector	Water policy	4.17
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	Capacity for implementing Rio Conventions in Samoa	Environmental policy	0.53
<b>Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)</b>	Economy-wide integration of CC Adaptation and DRM/DRR to Reduce Climate Vulnerability of Communities in Samoa	Multi-sector aid	12.52
<b>GEF</b>	Enhancing the Resilience of Tourism-reliant Communities to Climate Change Risks	Tourism policy	2.00
<b>Japan</b>	the Programme for Improving the Weather Forecasting System and Meteorological Warning Facilities	Disaster prevention and preparedness	8.49
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Energy generation-renewable	0.01
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Energy policy	0.01
<b>Japan</b>	Forest Preservation Programme	Environmental policy	3.42
<b>Korea</b>	PIF Special Training on Climate Change	Environmental policy	0.03
<b>New Zealand</b>	Samoa Renewable Energy Partnership (SED)	Energy generation –	12.03

<b>Source</b>	<b>Project/intervention title</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Amount</b>
		renewable	
<b>New Zealand</b>	Indigenous housing as a solution to climate risk	Housing policy	0.40
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	Solar Power Projects (550 kW)	Solar energy	5.41
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	Design, supply and install 500 kW micro grid-connected Wind power generation plant (funded by ADFD)	Wind energy	5.00
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>98.2</b>


### A.11 Solomon Islands

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$42.4 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Solomon Islands for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$111 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$42.4 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 35.9% (US\$15.2 million) supported mitigation activities, 62.3% (US\$26.4 million) was for adaptation, and 1.8% (US\$0.8 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The largest single sources of climate finance for Solomon Islands were the Global Environment Facility (GEF), including both the Trust Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund, followed by Japan and the Adaptation Fund. Finance has targeted a diversity of sectors, with the largest contributions to disaster prevention and preparedness, forestry policy, water policy and food aid/food security programmes. The country has also received general budget support from the European Union.

**Figure A11: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Solomon Islands (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

In addition, data on multilateral climate fund activities show that between January 2015 and September 2016, Solomon Islands was allocated US\$6.70 million for solar power development from the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program for Low Income Countries (SREP).

Table A11 lists individual climate finance contributions to Solomon Islands in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A11: Climate finance commitments to Solomon Islands, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source	Project/intervention title	Sector	Amount
<b>Adaptation Fund</b>	Enhancing resilience of communities	Food aid/food security programmes	5.53
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Islands Climate Prediction Phase 2	Environmental policy	0.03
<b>Australia</b>	Secretariat of the Pacific Community Climate Change Activities	Environmental policy	0.09
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Support for Coral Triangle Initiative – Second Phase	Environmental policy	0.32
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.64
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager, January–June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>Australia</b>	Community-based Climate Change Action Grants	Multi-sector aid	0.72
<b>EU Institutions</b>	Solomon Islands Climate Change Assistance Programme (SICAP)	General budget support	3.71
<b>Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)</b>	Community Resilience to Climate and Disaster Risk in Solomon Islands Project	Disaster prevention and preparedness	7.31
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	Integrated Forest Management in the Solomon Islands	Forestry policy	5.85
<b>GEF</b>	Solomon Islands Water Sector Adaptation Project (SIWSAP)	Water policy	7.00
<b>Italy</b>	Memorandum of Understanding – Solomon Island – Joint Committee (JC7)	Energy generation-renewable	0.23
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Improvement of Maravovo Water Supply	Basic drinking water supply	0.04
<b>Japan</b>	Disaster prevention and preparedness	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.23
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.22
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Enhancement of Disaster Preparedness in Tamboko Community	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.11
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for the Improvement of Radio Broadcasting Network for Administration of Disaster Prevention	Disaster prevention and preparedness	6.32
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Environmental policy	0.01
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	River basins development	0.13

<b>Source</b>	<b>Project/intervention title</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Amount</b>
<b>Korea</b>	PIF Special Training on Climate Change	Environmental policy	0.04
<b>Korea</b>	Establishment of Action Plan for Forest Resources Management	Forestry policy	1.50
<b>New Zealand</b>	Solar power in primary schools	Primary education	0.64
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Pacific Climate Change visit to UN	Bio-diversity	0.01
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Agro Forestry in Choiseul Province	Environmental policy	0.02
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Pacific Climate Change visit to UN	Environmental policy	0.00
<b>United States</b>	Coral Triangle Support Partnership (CTSP) – Program Design and Learning	Multi-sector aid	0.20
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>42.2</b>




## A.12 Timor Leste

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$102.5 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Timor Leste for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$128.5 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$102.5 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 29.8% (US\$30.6 million) supported mitigation activities, 68.3% (US\$70.1 million) was for adaptation, and 1.8% (US\$1.2 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The largest single sources of climate finance for Timor Leste were Japan, Australia and the Least Developed Countries Fund. Japan has mainly financed irrigation projects, Australia has supported water and sanitation, and Least Developed Countries Fund activities have mainly been coded as environmental policy. These are also the sectors that have received the largest overall allocations.

**Figure A12: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Timor Leste (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

Table A12 lists individual climate finance contributions to Timor Leste in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A12: Climate finance commitments to Timor Leste, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source	Project/intervention title	Sector	Amount
Australia	Climate Change NGO Partnership with Oxfam Aust.	Agricultural research	1.73
Australia	Rural Water Supply and Sanitation	Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation	3.54
Australia	Emergency capacity of NGOs and communities	Disaster prevention and preparedness	1.29
Australia	PACCSAP in East Timor	Environmental policy	1.11
Australia	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
Australia	Support for Coral Triangle Initiative – Second Phase	Environmental policy	0.32
Australia	Community-based Climate Change Action Grants	Multi-sector aid	1.89
Australia	Be'e Saneamentu no Ijiene iha Komunidade (BESIK) II – Program Costs	Water supply and sanitation – large systems	6.88
Australia	Be'e Saneamentu no Ijiene iha Komunidade (BESIK): Administered Program Support	Water supply and sanitation – large systems	7.25
Australia	BESIK II – Program Costs	Water supply and sanitation – large systems	1.23
EU Institutions	Global Climate Change Alliance Support Programme to Timor Leste	Environmental policy and admin. management	5.14
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	Promoting Sustainable Bio-energy Production from Biomass	Biofuel-fired power plants	1.80
GEF	Second Communication to the UNFCCC	Environmental policy	1.00
GEF	Strengthening the Resilience of Small Scale Rural Infrastructure and Local Government Systems to Climatic Variability and Risk	Urban development and management	4.72
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)	Building Shoreline Resilience of Timor Leste to Protect Local Communities and their Livelihoods	Environmental policy	7.15
LDCF	Climate Proofing Development in the Pacific	Environmental policy	3.04
LDCF	Strengthening Community Resilience to Climate Induced Natural Disasters in the Dili to Ainaro Road Development Corridor, Timor Leste	Environmental policy	5.37
LDCF	Upscaling Climate-Proofing in the Transport Sector in Timor-Leste: Sector Wide Approaches	Road transport	4.56
Japan	Project for Improvement of livelihood for the farmers in mountainous areas	Agricultural development	0.17
Japan	The Project for Rehabilitation and Improvement of Buluto Irrigation Scheme	Agricultural water resources	15.36
Japan	TC aggregated activities	Energy generation-renewable	0.00
Japan	TC aggregated activities	Environmental policy	0.26
Japan	The Forest Preservation Programme	Environmental policy	2.28

<b>Source</b>	<b>Project/intervention title</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Amount</b>
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Forestry policy	4.91
<b>Japan</b>	The Project of River Training for the Protection of Mola Bridge	Road transport	11.35
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Introduction of Clean Energy by Solar Electricity Generation System	Solar energy	5.70
<b>Korea</b>	Climate Change and Disaster Prevention	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.01
<b>Korea</b>	Environmental Protection Policy	Environmental policy	0.00
<b>Korea</b>	Sustainable power supply project through community-based self-supportive photovoltaic system	Solar energy	0.57
<b>Korea</b>	Sustainable power supply project through self photovoltaic system	Solar energy	0.44
<b>Portugal</b>	Cooperation between Águas de Portugal and Timor Leste in the water and sanitation sector.	Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation	0.08
<b>Spain</b>	Own call of interest. Project. Bring clean, bright light to Atauro.	Solar energy	0.00
<b>United States</b>	Coral Triangle Support Partnership (CTSP) – Natural Resources and Biodiversity	Bio-diversity	2.00
<b>United States</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) – Natural Resources and Biodiversity	Bio-diversity	0.60
<b>United States</b>	NOAA Participating Agency Program Agreement (PAPA) – Natural Resources and Biodiversity	Bio-diversity	0.40
<b>United States</b>	Coral Triangle Support Partnership (CTSP) – Clean Productive Environment	Biosphere protection	0.30
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>102.5</b>


### A.13 Tonga

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$67.4 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Tonga for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$74.6 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$67.4 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 59.7% (US\$40.2 million) supported mitigation activities, 39.9% (US\$26.9 million) was for adaptation, and 0.4% (US\$0.3 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The largest single sources of climate finance for Tonga were Japan and the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), followed by Australia and New Zealand. Japan has funded renewable energy, including solar energy, while the CIFs have supported “environmental policy”. These two sectors have also received the most climate finance overall.

**Figure A13: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Tonga (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

In addition, data on multilateral climate fund activities show that between January 2015 and September 2016, Tonga was allocated US\$2.64 million from the Global Environment Facility, for a renewable energy project.

Table A13 lists individual climate finance contributions to Tonga in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A13: Climate finance commitments to Tonga, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source	Project/intervention title	Sector	Amount
<b>Australia</b>	Tonga Disaster Preparedness and Response	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.57
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Appliance Labelling and Standards Program	Energy policy	1.04
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change Project	Environmental policy	3.52
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Islands Climate Prediction Phase 2	Environmental policy	0.05
<b>Australia</b>	Program Support Fund	Environmental policy	0.04
<b>Australia</b>	Secretariat of the Pacific Community Climate Change Activities	Environmental policy	0.06
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Tonga Climate Change Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.30
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.64
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager, January–June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>Australia</b>	Community-based Climate Change Action Grants	Multi-sector aid	0.25
<b>Climate Investment Funds (CIF)</b>	Climate Resilience Sector Project	Environmental policy and admin. management	19.95
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	R2R- Pacific Islands Ridge-to-Reef National Priorities – Integrated Water, Land, Forest and Coastal Management	Environmental policy and admin. mgmt	3.43
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Upgrading of Feletoa Village Water Supply System	Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation	0.08
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Upgrading of Ha'alaufuli Village Water Supply System	Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation	0.10
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Upgrading of Holonga Village Water Supply System	Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation	0.10
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Upgrading of Water Supply System for Falehau Village	Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation	0.10
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Upgrading of Water Supply System for Hihifo Village	Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation	0.08
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Upgrading of Water Supply System for Vaipoa Village	Basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation	0.09
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Energy generation – renewable	0.07
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Introduction of a Micro-Grid System with Renewable Energy for the Tonga Energy Road Map	Energy generation – renewable	16.12
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Environmental policy	0.01
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Fishing policy	0.28
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Public policy	0.00

<b>Source</b>	<b>Project/intervention title</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Amount</b>
<b>Japan</b>	the Project for Introduction of Clean Energy by Solar Electricity Generation System	Solar energy	6.72
<b>Korea</b>	PIF Special Training on Climate Change	Environmental policy and admin. Management	0.03
<b>New Zealand</b>	Renewable Energy	Energy generation – renewable	0.10
<b>New Zealand</b>	Renewable Energy – Solar Photovoltaic Plant, Tongatapu	Energy generation – renewable	7.20
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	Solar energy projects	Solar energy	5.00
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>67.41</b>


### A.14 Tuvalu

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$37.9 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Tuvalu for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$24.1 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$37.9 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 41.5% (US\$15.7 million) supported mitigation activities, 13.1% (US\$5 million) was for adaptation, and 45.4% (US\$17.2 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The largest single sources of climate finance for Tuvalu were New Zealand, the United Arab Emirates and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). New Zealand has mainly financed renewable energy projects, the UAE has also supported renewables, specifically solar, and the GEF contributions have been concentrated on “environmental policy”. Overall, a significant portion of the finance has been for renewable energy.

**Figure A14: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Tuvalu (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

In addition, data on multilateral climate fund activities show that between January 2015 and September 2016, Tuvalu was allocated US\$36 million from the Green Climate Fund, for coastal adaptation; and US\$2.64 million from the Global Environment Facility, to support sustainable national energy targets.

Table A14 lists individual climate finance contributions to Tuvalu in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A14: Climate finance commitments to Tuvalu, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source of funding	Project/Intervention title	Sector	US\$ Committed
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Islands Climate Prediction Phase 2	Environmental policy	0.03
<b>Australia</b>	Secretariat of the Pacific Community Climate Change Activities	Environmental policy	0.09
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.64
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager January – June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>Finland</b>	Establishment of Solar PV Generator system at the Tuvalu Maritime Training Institute on Amatuku Island	Solar energy	0.00
<b>Finland</b>	Local Cooperation Fund (LCF) in Tuvalu	Solar energy	0.08
<b>Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)</b>	Climate Proofing Development in the Pacific	Environmental policy	0.55
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	Effective and Responsive Island-level Governance to Secure and Diversify Climate Resilient Marine-based Coastal Livelihoods and Enhance Climate Hazard Response Capacity	Environmental policy	4.33
<b>Italy</b>	Memorandum of Understanding – Tuvalu Islands – Joint Committee (JC7)	Energy generation-renewable	0.02
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Disaster prevention and preparedness	0.78
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	River basins development	1.41
<b>Korea</b>	PIF Special Training on Climate Change	Environmental policy and admin. mgmt	0.03
<b>New Zealand</b>	Tuvalu renewable energy	Energy generation, renewable sources – multiple technologies	0.49
<b>New Zealand</b>	Tuvalu Renewable Energy Projects	Energy generation, renewable sources – multiple technologies	17.17
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	Design, supply and install 500 kW micro grid-connected PV plant. (Funded by ADFD)	Solar energy	5.00
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	Solar Power Projects (350 kW)	Solar energy	5.81
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Tuvalu desalination project	Sanitation – large systems	0.03
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>37.94</b>




### A.15 Vanuatu

In 2010–2014, a total of **US\$49.4 million** in grant (or grant-equivalent) finance was allocated to Vanuatu for activities that principally targeted climate change objectives. An additional US\$148.6 million in ODA that targeted other objectives was reported as having co-benefits for climate change objectives (i.e. climate change was tagged as a “significant” policy objective).

Of the US\$49.4 million specifically targeting climate change objectives, 57.2% (US\$28.2 million) supported mitigation activities, 39.9% (US\$19.7 million) was for adaptation, and 2.9% (US\$1.4 million) targeted both objectives simultaneously.

The largest single sources of climate finance for Vanuatu were the Global Environment Facility (GEF), under both its Trust Fund and Least Developed Countries Fund, Australia and the United Arab Emirates. The GEF has concentrated mainly on “environmental policy”, Australia’s support has been spread across multiple sectors (and has included a component of direct budget support), while the UAE has focused on solar energy projects. Overall, the sectors that have received the largest allocations are environmental policy, renewables, and disaster prevention and preparedness.

**Figure A15: Sources of finance, sectoral distribution and policy objectives, Vanuatu (million US\$)**



Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, contributions tagged against the Rio Marker where climate change was the primary objective.

In addition, data on multilateral climate fund activities show that between January 2015 and September 2016, Vanuatu was allocated US\$0.30 million from the Green Climate Fund, for

readiness; US\$5.65 million from the LDCF, for a project to protect urban areas; and a US\$7 million energy access grant from the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program for Low Income Countries (SREP).

Table A15 lists individual climate finance contributions to Vanuatu in 2010–2014; the title of the project/intervention is as listed in the CRS database.

**Table A15: Climate finance commitments to Vanuatu, 2010–2014 (million US\$)**

Source	Project/intervention title	Sector	Amount
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Appliance Labelling and Standards Program	Energy policy and administrative management	1.04
<b>Australia</b>	Millennium Development Goal Carbon Facility for Sustainable Development	Environmental policy	0.34
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Islands Climate Prediction Phase 2	Environmental policy	0.06
<b>Australia</b>	Secretariat of the Pacific Community Climate Change Activities	Environmental policy	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Small Island Developing States Community-based Adaptation Program	Environmental policy	0.07
<b>Australia</b>	Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific	Environmental research	0.64
<b>Australia</b>	Engagement of COSPPac Manager January – June 2012	Environmental research	0.01
<b>Australia</b>	Initiative design	Environmental research	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Pacific Australia CC Science & Adaptation Planning	Environmental research	1.40
<b>Australia</b>	Climate Change Implications Taro/Cassava	Food crop production	0.08
<b>Australia</b>	Understanding the responses of taro and cassava to climate change	Food crop production	0.05
<b>Australia</b>	Power Sector	General budget support	2.58
<b>Australia</b>	Community-based Climate Change Action Grants	Multi-sector aid	1.43
<b>Australia</b>	Land Program Procurement Management	Rural development	0.00
<b>Australia</b>	Power Sector	Rural development	2.67
<b>Canada</b>	Support to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility's Readiness Fund / Appui au Fonds de préparation du Fonds de partenariat pour le carbone forestier	Forestry policy & administrative management	1.09
<b>Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)</b>	Adaptation to Climate Change in the Coastal Zone in Vanuatu	Environmental policy	8.28
<b>LDCF</b>	Climate Proofing Development in the Pacific	Environmental policy	5.75
<b>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</b>	R2R: Integrated Sustainable Land and Coastal Management	Environmental policy	4.74
<b>GEF</b>	Geothermal Power and Electricity Sector Development Project	Geothermal energy	0.91
<b>Japan</b>	The Project for Improvement of Equipment for Disaster Risk Management	Disaster prevention and preparedness	3.76
<b>Japan</b>	TC aggregated activities	Energy generation, renewable sources – multiple technologies	0.00

<b>New Zealand</b>	Vanuatu Rural Electrification Project	Solar energy	4.98
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	Design, supply and install 500 kWp micro grid-connected PV plant. (Funded by ADFD)	Solar energy	5.00
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	Solar Power Projects (501 kW)	Solar energy	4.49
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>49.4</b>



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