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Financing Planned Relocation and Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change in the Pacific Region

This research brief was prepared by Dr Fanny Thornton under the guidance of the Pacific Resilience Partnership Technical Working Group on Human Mobility (PRP TWG-HM), chaired by the International Organization for Migration. Inputs were received from a peer review committee chaired by Meiapo Faasau, IFRC and comprising Celia McMichael, University of Melbourne; Peter Emberson, ESCAP; Nacanieli Bolo, IDMC; Francesca Marzatico, University of Otago; Patrina Dumar, GNS; Anaïs Rouveyrol, SPC; Teea Tira, PIFS; Solomon Kantha and Sabira Coelho, IOM; Jamal Talagi, Niue; Bruce Burson, New Zealand). The TWG acknowledges all the valuable inputs received from TWG members and others in developing this research brief. Progressing the research brief has been made possible with the generous support of the Swiss Confederation through the Intra-ACP GCCA+ Adaptation to Climate Change and Resilience Building (PACRES) Action. It was identified as a means to provide critical information to fill knowledge gaps which can feed into policy and programmatic recommendations and support policy development with the areas of the research briefs identified and selected by the PRP TWG-HM through outcomes from webinars, online surveys and consultations with stakeholders.

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Anthropogenic climate change and its consequences affect human mobility patterns, such as migration, displacement, autonomous and planned relocation, and immobility, both voluntary and involuntary. Attention has turned to policy development relating to human mobility in the context of climate change,¹ with the Pacific Island region at the forefront of this evolution.²

1 E.g. Refugees International, 'Blue Ribbon Panel Presents Ground-Breaking Recommendations to President on the Climate Crisis and Global Migration' (14 July 2021), available here: <https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2021/7/13/blue-ribbon-panel-presents-groundbreaking-recommendations-to-president-on-the-climate-crisis-and-global-migration>. Also, Displacement Solutions, *The Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement within States* (2013), available here: <http://displacementsolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Peninsula-Principles.pdf>.

2 See, e.g. Fanny Thornton *et al.* *Policy Developments and Options to Address Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change Risk in the Pacific Islands Region* (PUB2021/085/R, Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security Policy Series, International Organization for Migration, Fiji, 2021).

Policy generation has focused on highlighting the issue and, more concretely, the development of guidelines regulating and supporting people movement, particularly in the context of displacement and planned relocation.³

Mobility also undoubtedly requires resources – individual, community and national. This is of significant concern to governments and policy makers in the region.⁴ This brief therefore focuses on financial resources in support of planned relocation and other types of climate change-related mobility in the Pacific region. Following some discussion of context (Section 2), the brief focuses on four areas.

First, it seeks to establish the need or demand for financial resources by looking at what needs, and what associated costs, are generated through different types of climate change-related mobility. As relevant debates have also extended to immobility (both desired and undesired),⁵ needs and costs involved for those that cannot (or do not wish to) move will also find brief attention in this section (Section 3).

Second, the brief discusses sources of funding, actual and potential, focusing on the international, regional and domestic realms, and with it the various financial tools that could be harnessed, and their limitations (Section 4).

Third, this brief highlights issues of distribution and allocation of financial resources, suggesting a principles-based approach and practice around this (Section 5).

Finally, this paper discusses matters of governance around the financial architecture in the region for climate change-related mobility. It looks at existing structures and approaches and discusses their interaction and expansion, as well as the avoidance of duplication (Section 6).

The brief concludes with recommendations grounded in the analysis presented in this brief to guide policy debate and practice (Section 7).

A desk-based methodology of reviewing the relevant literature and studies was applied. This was supplemented by research participant interviews and correspondence (n=10). Research participants were drawn from the author's networks and the brief's sponsors – the Pacific Resilience Partnership's Technical Working Group on Human Mobility and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Participants included members of civil society, international organisations, research and policy communities.

3 E.g. Government of Fiji, *Planned Relocation Guidelines: A Framework to Undertake Climate Change Related Relocation* (2018), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5c3c92204.html>; Government of Vanuatu, *National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement* (2018) available at: <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/default/files/iom-vanuatu-policy-climate-change-disaster-induced-displacement-2018.pdf>; and Government of Fiji, *Displacement Guidelines: In the Context of Climate Change and Disasters* (2020) available at: <https://www.adaptationcommunity.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Displacement-Guidelines-Fiji-2019.pdf>

4 See, e.g. 'Fiji National Consultation on Climate Mobility. 20–21 July 2021: Summary Report' (2021) and 'Nauru National Consultation on Climate Mobility. 15–16 June 2021: Summary Report' (2021); also International Organization for Migration, 'Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security (PCCMHS) Programme: Regional Policy Dialogue – Summary Report' (2021).

5 E.g. Carol Farbotko and Celia McMichael, 'Voluntary Immobility and Existential Security in a Changing Climate in the Pacific' (2019) 60(2) *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 148-162 (Special Issue: *Climate-Related Displacement in the Asia-Pacific*); and Kira Walker, 'Immobility: The Neglected Flipside of the Climate Displacement Crisis', *The New Humanitarian* (online), 26 April 2021, available here: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2021/4/26/the-climate-displacement-crisis-has-a-neglected-flipside>

2.0 REGIONAL CONTEXT: MOBILITY, PRECEDENT AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Mobility context

Climate change alters average temperatures, weather, the natural environment, and habitats.⁶ This has consequences, frequently detrimental or undesired, for flora, fauna and human communities. Climate-driven changes in and around small islands, including those in the South Pacific, encompass both slow and rapid-onset changes. Examples are sea-level rise leading to inundation, saltwater intrusion and shoreline retreat; increase in the intensity of storms and cyclones; ocean acidification; and marine heatwaves.⁷ These all have consequences related to human habitation and livelihoods.⁸ That they also affect human mobility patterns is generally accepted,⁹ although the relationship is not necessarily straightforward,¹⁰ and mobility is (and is viewed as) only one response to changing conditions, including those stemming from climatic change.¹¹

Although mobility has historically and contemporarily been a measure engaged in by inhabitants of the region, often to enhance livelihood opportunities and resilience,¹² place attachment and habitation permanence are common within customary land tenure regimes, as climate change affects the region.¹³ This may bode less well for at least some of the 1.7 million regional inhabitants that, a 2014 study suggested, would migrate or be displaced within a generation because of the effects of climate change.¹⁴ The number stated in the study amounts to about ten per cent of the regional population estimate for 2050.¹⁵ Already, Pacific Islanders are on the move within the region and beyond on account of climate change. Mobility patterns connected to this include community relocations (sometimes partial);¹⁶ rural to urban migration; and overseas migration, often connected to employment opportunities. Immobility is also a chosen strategy as an expression of place and cultural attachment.¹⁷

- 6 E.g. IPCC, *Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge University Press, 2021).
- 7 IPCC, *Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contributions of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Regional Fact Sheets: Small Islands* (Cambridge University Press, 2021).
- 8 E.g. IPCC, *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Fact Sheet – Small Islands* (Cambridge University Press, 2022).
- 9 E.g. IPCC, *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge University Press, 2022) e.g. ch 7 and ch 8, also Foresight, 'Migration and Global Environmental Change: Final Report' (Government Science Office, UK, 2011); also, Robert McLeman, 'Migration and Displacement Risks Due to Mean Sea-Level Rise' (2018) 74 *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 148-154 and Lacey Allgood and Karen E. McNamara, 'Climate-Induced Migration: Exploring Local Perspectives in Kiribati' (2016) 38(3) *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 370–385.
- 10 See, e.g. John Campbell, 'Climate-Change Migration in the Pacific' (2014) 26(1) *The Contemporary Pacific* 1-28 and Kees van der Geest, Maxine Burkett, Juno Fitzpatrick, Mark Stege and Brittany Wheeler, 'Climate Change, Ecosystems Services and Migration in the Marshall Islands: Are They Related?' (2020) 161 *Climatic Change* 109–127.
- 11 E.g. Kees van der Geest, Maxine Burkett, Juno Fitzpatrick, Mark Stege and Brittany Wheeler, 'Marshallese Perspectives on Migration in the Context of Climate Change' (2019, IOM Policy Brief), available here: <http://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:7422>. Also Jon Barnett notes that focusing on displacement might hinder otherwise promising adaptation efforts, in 'The Dilemmas of Normalising Losses from Climate Change: Towards Hope for Pacific Atoll Countries' (2017) 58(1) *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 3–13. And Carol Farbotko, Elaine, Stratford and Heather Lazarus, 'Climate Migrations and New Identities? The Geopolitics of Embracing or Rejecting Mobility' (2015) 17(4) *Social and Cultural Geography* 533–552.
- 12 Jon Barnett and Celia McMichael, 'The Effects of Climate Change on the Geography and Timing of Human Mobility' (2018) 39 *Population and Environment* 339–56
- 13 Annah E. Piggott-McKellar, Karen E. McNamara, Patrick D. Nunn and Seci T Sekinini, 'Moving People in a Changing Climate: Lessons from two Case Studies in Fiji' (2019) 8(5) *Social Sciences* 133–151; also, Nikita Perumal, '“The Place Where I Live Is Where I Belong”: Community Perspectives on Climate Change and Climate-Related Migration in the Pacific Island Nation of Vanuatu' (2018) 13 *Island Studies Journal* 45–64.
- 14 John Campbell and Olivia Warrick, *Climate Change and Migration Issues in the Pacific*, (UNESCAP and ILO, Fiji, 2014).
- 15 SPC, *Pacific Island Populations 2020* (2021), available here: https://pacificsecurity.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Pacific_Islands_2020_Populations_poster.pdf.
- 16 Note for example the community relocations under way in Fiji (e.g. Vunidogoloa in Vanua Levu), with dozens more earmarked for relocation there and elsewhere in the region; see, e.g. Piggott-McKellar *et al.* above n 12; also, Celia McMichael, Manasa Katonivualiku and Teresia Powell, 'Planned Relocation and Everyday Agency in Low-Lying Coastal Villages in Fiji' (2019) 185(3) *Geographic Journal* 325–337. Also, on relocation in Solomon Islands, see, e.g. Simon Albert *et al.* 'Heading for the Hills: Climate-driven Community Relocations in the Solomon Islands and Alaska Provide Insight for a 1.5 °C Future' (2018) 18 *Regional Environmental Change* 2261–72. On Papua New Guinea, see, e.g. John Connell, 'Last Days in the Carteret Islands? Climate Change, Livelihoods and Migration on Coral Atolls', (2016) 57 *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 3–15.
- 17 E.g. Fanny Thornton *et al.*, 'Multiple Mobilities in Pacific Island Communities' (2020) 64 *Forced Migration Review* 32-35 (Special Issue: *Climate Crisis and Local Communities*). One respondent also noted that hesitancy to move might stem from perceptions that prior mobility, for example

Precedent

Human mobility (as well as immobility) is seldom motivated by a single cause.¹⁸ Factors that affect it include environmental stimuli, either rapid or slow-onset; the political context; the geographical, demographic, socio-economic and cultural contexts; the normative context (e.g. with respect to land rights, available migration channels, governance, or principles guiding mobility) and resources. These factors, together or separately, affect the ability or desire to move, as well as the experience with moving itself.

In a 2019 study of government-supported community relocations in response to the impacts of climate change in Fiji, Piggott-McKellar *et al.* note that such relocations, if planned well, can be a positive experience, one which enhances livelihoods opportunities.¹⁹ They highlight careful and inclusive planning and management of relocation as vital to preventing exposure to further hazards.

Another study of climate-driven community relocations was undertaken in 2018 in Solomon Islands and Alaska. It notes that, amongst complex planning processes, lacking governance frameworks and land tenure arrangements, a lack of resources has inhibited relocation success, at least in the short term.²⁰

Boston *et al.*, in a recent broad review of funding for climate-related planned relocation, note that current funding regimes prioritise mobility resourcing following rapid onset events (e.g. storms), with funding related to slow-onset events (e.g. sea level rise, drought), and thus especially for pre-emptive/planned relocation, inadequate.²¹ Experience with development-related displacement and involuntary relocation evidences a host of challenges and failures, including in the region.²² Even where funding (e.g. compensation) is available to mobile people and communities, livelihoods and other challenges can persist,²³ unless funding is accompanied by consultation, proactive income and livelihoods restoration and broader safety nets.²⁴

Policy development

Given that the Pacific Island region is particularly vulnerable to climate change,²⁵ it is unsurprising that policy-making concerning mobility in the context of climate change is on the rise. A 2021 review highlights the fact that policy-making in the region has moved from mobility being a concern in broad climate change policy to its being the subject of dedicated instruments, at least in some of the region's nations, including Fiji and Vanuatu.²⁶

regional relocations, had not gone well; pers. com, Susanna Price (College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University), 8th Sept. 2021 (online) and 27th Sept 2021 (email).

18 Foresight, above n 8. Also pers. com., Patrina Dumaru (GNS Science, New Zealand, University of the South Pacific), 21 Sept. 2021 (via email).

19 Piggott-McKellar *et al.* above n 12.

20 Albert . above n 15.

21 Jonathan Boston, Architesh Panda, Swenja Surminski, 'Designing a Funding Framework for the Impacts of Slow-Onset Climate Change – Insights from Recent Experiences with Planned Relocation' (2021) 50 *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability* 159–168.

22 E.g. Christopher A. McDowell, 'Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation: Implications for Land Acquisition and Population Relocation' (2013) 31(6) *Development Policy Review* 677-695, also, Susanna Price, 'Looking Back on Development and Disaster-Related Displacement and Resettlement, Anticipating Climate-Related Displacement in the Asia Pacific Region' (2019) 60(2) *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 119–204 and Tammy Tabe, 'Climate Change Migration and Displacement: Learning from Past Relocations in the Pacific' (2019) 8 *Social Sciences* 1–18.

23 Michael M Cernea, 'For a New Economics of Resettlement: A Sociological Critique of the Compensation Principle' (2003) 55 *International Social Science Journal* 37; also, Sreya Maitra, 'Development Induced Displacement: Issues of Compensation and Resettlement – Experiences from the Narmada Valley and Sardar Sarovar Project' (2009) 10 *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 191.

24 Susan D Tamondong, 'Can Improved Resettlement Reduce Poverty?' in Cernea and Mathur (eds) *Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? Reforming Resettlement through Investment and Benefit-Sharing* (Oxford University Press, 2008) 394.

25 IPCC, 'Small Islands' in *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

26 Thornton *et al.*, above n 2. See also: Government of Fiji, *Planned Relocation Guidelines: A Framework to Undertake Climate Change Related Relocation* (2018), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5c3c92204.html>, Government of Vanuatu, *National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement* (2018) available at: <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/default/files/iom-vanuatu-policy-climate-change-disaster-induced-displacement-2018.pdf> and Government of Fiji, *Displacement Guidelines: In the Context of Climate Change and Disasters* (2020) available at: <https://www.adaptationcommunity.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Displacement-Guidelines-Fiji-2019.pdf>.

Dedicated policy instruments focus on mobility processes and principles, which guide public authorities and other stakeholders in supporting communities and people on the move, paying particular attention to human rights, consultation and participation in decision-making and post-mobility livelihoods.

Regionally, the Nansen Initiative Pacific Regional Consultation in 2013 recommended that a regional approach to addressing climate change- and disaster-related mobility is taken, a process initiated by way of a Regional Policy Dialogue under the Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security (PCCCMHS) programme in late 2020.²⁷ The dialogue highlighted, amongst several modalities of a potential regional response, ‘considerations on financial support in order to enable countries to address climate-related mobility and implement related policies.’²⁸ A submission on Pacific Perspectives and Practices on Climate Change and Disaster Displacement to the Pacific Regional Consultation on Internal Displacement in 2021 also highlighted resourcing and finance as a key message of consideration.²⁹

3.0 HUMAN MOBILITY FINANCING: NEEDS AND COSTS

The needs that must be met in relation to mobility and associated costs are multifarious and depend on a number of factors. In relation to environmental change, they are conceptualised to stem from either rapid or slow onset change. Where rapid-onset environmental change affects mobility (e.g. via storms, flooding, etc.), essential needs and costs are likely to stem from disaster preparation and response, as well as shelter building and rebuilding – of homes, infrastructure and livelihoods – either in situ or elsewhere. In other words, it evolves around displacement management and humanitarian assistance. Where slow-onset environmental change affects mobility (e.g. drought, sea-level rise), essential needs and costs are likely to stem from planning for and implementing relocation and reestablishment – of the homes, infrastructure and livelihoods on which individuals, households or communities depend. This ought to be done in a better location than the place of origin, which may be near or far and challenging to identify or access. Labour mobility has also been canvassed as one option to facilitate mobility in this context (incremental change). Costs related to labour mobility involve the provision of soft and hard skills to those affected and wishing to go.³⁰

Immobility also generates needs and costs. The adaptive response here is not moving but staying put voluntarily, for reasons that include place attachment and culture, or involuntarily for lack of opportunity or resources. Resources, including financial ones, are required to enable staying put in safety. Countering the impacts of environmental change via infrastructure development (small and large) and support for habitation and livelihoods are likely going to be the tangible needs that require the most inputs. It is not inconceivable that in the climate mobility context the needs of the mobile, involuntarily immobile and voluntarily immobile will have to be met simultaneously.

Beyond tangible needs, intangible needs (non-economic losses, social capital, etc.) must also be addressed.³¹ Several research respondents noted mental health concerns involved in climate-driven mobility. One respondent highlighted that this had received insufficient attention in planned relocations associated with climate change which had already occurred in the region, with the

27 International Organization for Migration, above n 4.

28 Ibid, 10f.

29 UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, ‘Pacific Regional Consultation on Internal Displacement: Pacific Perspectives and Practices on Climate Change and Disaster Displacement’ (2021) 2. Note also that the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement has facilitated discussion in support of a Global Fund for Internal Displacement Solutions: see UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, ‘Financing for Action on Internal Displacement: Discussion Paper’ (2021).

30 See, e.g. Thornton *et al.* above n 2.

31 See also Karen E. McNamara, Ross Westoby and Alvin Chandra, ‘Exploring Climate Driven Non-Economic Loss and Damage in the Pacific Islands’ (2021) 50 *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability* 1–11, esp. 2–5 on human mobility and territory.

civil society/NGO sector subsequently seeking to fill gaps.³² Another respondent urged that mental health concerns must be built into funding models for mobility in the climate change context.³³

Cultural aspects were also noted as requiring resources, with the example of exploring farewell rituals from places of origin highlighted by one respondent.³⁴ One respondent emphasised that even planned relocations deemed relatively successful can lead to unanticipated consequences, with anecdotal evidence suggesting, for example, amplified household tensions in some cases on account of more private housing being built in the new location.³⁵ A respondent from Niue outlined how she had sourced a financial contribution of USD 30,000 from UN Women in order to work in particular with women in local communities to overcome friction stemming from unpreparedness in past climate-driven relocations, and to “unpack the impacts of climate change with the women to ensure overall cohesion going forward to develop community plans (to align with an aspired national framework) to help families relocate to higher ground”.³⁶

The actual costs of climate mobility will vary, according to location, climate change impacts and mobility response, amongst many other factors.³⁷ That said, there are indicators of the costs involved in some instances. For example, the planned relocation of the Fijian village of Vunidogoloa, which commenced in 2014 and affected about 100 households, cost USD 980,000 (with the government contributing ca. USD 740,000 and the remainder contributed as logged timber for housing construction by the community;³⁸ plus additional contributions from qualified volunteers provided by the International Labor Organization).³⁹ One research respondent noted that major costs involved in the Vunidogoloa relocation concerned site leveling, housing construction, pathway establishment, hardware purchasing or sourcing, livelihoods diversification and plantation establishment.⁴⁰

The Fijian village of Narikoso (25 households) is also due to be relocated. A detailed cost/benefit analysis states the full estimated cost of the relocation of the entire village as just over FJD 1 million (appr. USD 480,000), with the biggest costs being nearly half this amount for materials for housing.⁴¹ Unquantifiable costs are also covered in the analysis, although no monetary value is attached.⁴² Elsewhere in the region, the relocation of the much larger Choiseul township in Solomon Islands (1,000 people) has been noted to likely cost “hundreds of millions of Australian dollars”.⁴³

4.0 PLANNED RELOCATION AND HUMAN MOBILITY FINANCING: SOURCES

Financial resources in support of mobility in the context of climate change in the region are unlikely to stem from a single source. Rather, a multitude of channels may be relevant and should be considered.

32 Pers. com., Frances Namoumou (Pacific Conference of Churches), 07th Sept. 2021 (online).

33 Pers. com., Alvin Chandra (United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya) 9th Sept 2021 (online).

34 Pers. com., Frances Namoumou, above n 31.

35 Pers. com., Celia McMichael (University of Melbourne), 9th Sept. 2021 (online).

36 Pers. com., Jama'l Talagi (Hafonu Consultancy, Niue), 13th Sept. 2021 (online) and 28th Sept (email). The respondent noted past relocation stemming from Cyclone Heta in 2004.

37 See above subsection – ‘Precedent’.

38 According to one research respondent, the irony of facing relocation on account of the effects of climate change and then making a contribution to the relocation by felling a carbon store was not lost on the community; pers. com., Celia McMichael, above n 34.

39 Giulia Borsa, ‘Vunidogoloa: What Can We Learn from Climate Change Relocation?’ (2020) *Transformative Humanities*, available here: <https://www.kth.se/blogs/hist/2020/01/vunidogoloa-what-can-we-learn-from-climate-change-relocation/>.

40 Pers. com., Celia McMichael, above n 34.

41 James Jolliffe, ‘Economic Dimensions of Relocation as an Adaptation Strategy to Climate Change: A Case Study of the Narikoso Relocation Project, Fiji’ (Geoscience Division, Pacific Community, 2018) 24, available here: <http://acseppacific.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Economic-dimensions-of-relocation-as-an-adaptation-strategy-in-Fiji-V2.pdf>.

42 Ibid, 21f.

43 Township in Solomon Islands is the first in Pacific to Relocate Due to Climate Change’, *Scientific American*, 15 August 2014 (online), available here: <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/township-in-solomon-islands-is-1st-in-pacific-to-relocate-due-to-climate-change/#>.

International

The international climate finance architecture is diffuse, keeps evolving, and exists within the context of the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC), as well as beyond.⁴⁴ It is resourced by multilateral, regional and bilateral channels, although accessing, monitoring, regulating and accounting for contributions to it has proven difficult. Accurately accessing climate finance figures pertaining to the region is not straightforward, with the Pacific Climate Change Portal of the Climate Finance Navigator one notable resource⁴⁵ and the Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Database another.⁴⁶ In recent remarks, Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General, Henry Puna, noted how climate finance flows to the region compare poorly with flows of development aid.⁴⁷ A 2022 report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concerning climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability notes small islands, such as those in the Pacific, face ‘barriers and constraints’ in climate adaptation for a number of reasons, including gaps in financial resourcing.⁴⁸

UNFCCC: Adaptation or loss and damage funding

Mobility is widely regarded as an adaptation response to climate change, being acknowledged as such by the UNFCCC,⁴⁹ where in situ adaptation is not possible. Furthermore, adaptation measures may contribute to preventing or limiting mobility,⁵⁰ where desired and possible. Framing mobility in terms of adaptation is, therefore, relevant where financial resources are sought under adaptation funding channels. Additionally, under the UNFCCC, mobility is also understood with reference to loss and damage, with the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage having an express mandate to address mobility via its Taskforce on Displacement,⁵¹ as well as an express mandate to “enhanced action and support, including finance, technology and capacity building, to address loss and damage”.⁵²

Funding channels under UNFCCC continue to remain focused on individual projects relating to mitigation and, to a lesser extent, adaptation, with financing of loss and damage fraught with difficulty,⁵³ although this may change in future. The decision announcing adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement states that “Article 8 [on Loss and Damage] of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability of compensation”⁵⁴ and climate funds under UNFCCC largely operate to support adaptation and mitigation activities – for now. The funds in Table 1 are potentially relevant to mobility finance.

44 A good resource covering the intricate web of climate finance is Climate Funds Update, available here: <https://climatefundsupdates.org/the-funds/>.

45 Available here: https://cfn.pacificclimatechange.net/?_cf_chl_jschl_tk=__pmd_c_GtEnENbWKfDI_Zh_iTF2iS9GbjZ56Zy2FZk9KORl-1631093164-0-gqNtZGzNAdCjcnBszQr9.

46 Available here: <https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/>.

47 IPCC

48 n 8.

49 E.g. Environmental Migration Portal, IOM, *Human Mobility in the UNFCCC*, available here: <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/human-mobility-unfccc>; also Richard Black, Stephen R.G. Bennet, Sandy M. Thomas and John R. Beddington, ‘Climate Change: Migration as Adaptation’ (2011) 478(7370) *Nature* 447–449; see also Art 14f of the Cancun Adaptation Framework.

50 IPCC, *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Summary for Policy Makers* (Cambridge University Press, 2022) 26.

51 UNFCCC, *Adoption of the Paris Agreement*, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (12 December 2015) 50.

52 UNFCCC, *Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change* (2014) <http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/items/8134.php>.

53 Thomas Hirsch *et al*, ‘Climate Finance for Addressing Loss and Damage: How to Mobilize Support for Developing Countries to Tackle Loss and Damage’ (Brot für die Welt, 2019), 44ff, available here: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ClimateFinance_LossDamage.pdf. Also, Saleemul Huq, ‘The Era of Loss and Damage from Climate Change is Upon Us’, *The Daily Star* (online), 4 August 2021, available here: <https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/politics-climate-change/news/the-era-loss-and-damage-climate-change-upon-us-2144111>.

54 UNFCCC, *Adoption of the Paris Agreement*, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (12 December 2015) 51.

Table 1. Funds potentially relevant to mobility finance

Fund	Opportunities	Challenges
<p>Green Climate Fund (GCF)⁵⁵ Operational: 2015</p> <p><i>Details:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • funded by developed country UNFCCC parties and otherwise by both private and public entities • supports developing country mitigation and adaptation activities (see comment under Challenges on loss and damage) • can support NAP preparation and project implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a target of at least 50% of funding to go to adaptation support and 50% of this ringfenced for particularly vulnerable countries, including LDCs and SIDS. • investment areas include human security, livelihoods and well-being support • applies to activities related to risk financing and risk management (e.g. insurance against losses that might also have a mobility dimension) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • cumbersome applications and slow approval⁵⁶ • particular challenges of access for Pacific SIDS⁵⁷ • under 100 projects on adaptation are presently under way globally – amidst more limited staffing around adaptation expertise – relative to expertise around mitigation⁵⁸ • conceptually, an adaptation/development divide is pursued, with projects needing to demonstrate a “climate rationale” and not “development as usual”⁵⁹ • no significant experience with loss and damage funding⁶⁰ • no mobility project funded so far (but some adaptation projects may have a mobility prevention dimension, even if inadvertently (e.g. climate resilient food security in FSM, building climate resilient islands in the Maldives, water supply security in Kiribati, and hazard warning systems in multiple places)
<p>Adaptation Fund (AF)⁶¹ Operational: 2009</p> <p><i>Details:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • funded in part through earnings from the Clean Development Mechanism, plus developed country contributions • supports funding for adaptation-related projects in developing countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • governance is mainly led by developing countries (including one board rep from SIDS – currently Fiji) • prioritises needs of vulnerable populations • applications not particularly cumbersome 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • generally low funding capacity • there are waitlists with respect to funding • mobility not a project area funded per se (but many projects concern community resilience to the impacts of climate change – and thus people’s ability to stay)

55 <https://www.greenclimate.fund>

56 See Green Climate Fund, Independent Evaluation Unit, ‘Independent Synthesis Report of the Climate Fund’s Accreditation Function’ (2020), available here: <https://ie.u.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/evaluation/accreditation-final-report.pdf>, which notes timeframes for accreditation of organisations and approval of projects; one research participant noted that under new leadership, it seems as though timeframes are improving; pers. com., Pia Treichel (University of Melbourne), 2nd September 2021 (online).

57 Jale Samuwei and Jeremy Maxwell Hills, ‘Gazing of the Horizon: Will an Equitable Green Climate Fund Allocation Policy Be Significant for Pacific post-2020?’ (2019) 25 Pacific Journalism Review.

58 Pia Treichel, above n 53.

59 Ibid. The respondent notes that LDCs and SIDS have indicated that this can prove a difficult hurdle for adaptation projects; on this also Climate Analytics, ‘Enhancing the Climate Rationale for GCF Proposals’ (2020), available here: <https://climateanalytics.org/publications/2020/enhancing-the-climate-rationale-for-gcf-proposals/>. On loss and damage, note also the recently emerged Santiago Network, to mobilise assistance around loss and damage: see <https://sdg.iisd.org/news/unfccc-launches-website-to-mobilize-santiago-network-on-loss-and-damage/>

60 Note the 2019 COP (Madrid) – Decision 2/CMA.2 on the *Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts* and its 2019 Review notes a role for the GCF in this capacity, one which it is to further clarify, not least with respect to developing country parties; see FCCC/PA/CMA/2019/6/Add.1, para 38, 39.

61 <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/>.

Table 1. Funds potentially relevant to mobility finance

Fund	Opportunities	Challenges
<p>Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)⁶² Operational: 2002</p> <p><i>Details:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> operated under the Global Environment Facility (GEF, World Bank), plus its implementing agencies (incl. Asian Development Bank) has supported preparation of NAPAs and now NAPs, plus specific projects contained therein 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> least developed countries focused adaptation focused focused on implementation of NAPAs, but also NAPs if mobility is in NAPAs/NAPs, then funding is a possibility doesn't preclude funding related to loss and damage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> not all vulnerable countries in the region can access this not many regional nations presently have NAPs mobility is not a project area funded per se so far, but many projects concern community resilience to the impacts of climate change – and thus people's ability to stay demand exceeds funds and many projects contained in (the older) NAPAs have remained unfunded
<p>Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)⁶³ Operational: 2002</p> <p><i>Details:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> also operated under the Global Environment Facility (GEF, World Bank) established in support of climate proofing national development sectors now also mandated to support NAP processes in least developed and developing country contexts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> least developed and developing contexts adaptation focused mobility-related project in principle not precluded loss and damage related funding not necessarily precluded 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> not many regional nations presently have NAPs few successes in the Pacific region mobility not a project area funded per se, so far but many projects concern community resilience to the impacts of climate change – and thus people's ability to stay demand exceeds funds; projects have not gone to approval over lack of funds, even if otherwise having merit

Accessing international climate finance is cumbersome and affected by often burdensome and lengthy application processes, frequently involving middlemen in the form of accredited entities or implementing agencies, mitigation bias at least in some funds, a project-by-project approach to addressing climate change impacts, large project bias with at least some funds (e.g. the GCF) and demand exceeding supply.⁶⁴ This affects funding for climate change-related activities in general, and for mobility in particular, which at best infrequently makes an appearance in international climate finance projects or proposals.⁶⁵ One research participant noted that village heads in communities affected by climate change mobility pressures (in this case in Fiji) are not unaware of this circumstance and the challenges they face in tapping into international climate finance for mobility support.⁶⁶

Despite such shortcomings, having a NAPA (National Adaptation Programme of Action) and now a NAP (National Adaptation Plan) can assist in securing adaptation funding under many UNFCCC-aligned channels, at least on a project- or activity-basis, and potentially funding for mobility – beyond its prevention – may be possible. One research respondent noted that NAPs and the projects or activities they list signal to funding bodies a “strong motivation” for securing funding.⁶⁷

62 <https://www.thegef.org/topics/least-developed-countries-fund-ldcf>.

63 <https://www.thegef.org/topics/special-climate-change-fund-sccf>.

64 Pers. com., Pia Treichel, above n 53; also Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat – for Department of National Planning & Monitoring (DNPM) and the Climate Change and Development Authority (CCDA), Papua New Guinea, 'Options for Strengthening Climate Finance Coordination and Accessibility in Papua New Guinea: Final Report' (2019).

65 Note Togo's recent Concept Note (a GCF project proposal) entitled 'Addressing Accelerated Climate Change-Induced Urban-to-Rural Migration Through Low Emissions Climate Resilient Agro-Spatial Development in Togo' (Final Submission 2021), available here: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/25740-addressing-accelerating-climate-change-induced-urban-rural-migration-through-low-emissions.pdf>. It is uncertain when or whether the project may receive funding.

66 Pers. com., Celia McMichael, above n 34.

67 Pers. com., Pia Treichel, above n 53.

Most regional nations had submitted NAPAs and mobility finds expression there, more so in the sense of desiring its prevention.⁶⁸ Only two regional nations presently have NAPs, Fiji's NAP, finalised in 2018, notes amongst actions it wishes to pursue the relocation of communities and diverse social groups vulnerable to climate change and disaster displacement and migration,⁶⁹ and the provision of affordable serviced land, including that generated by enhanced rural to urban migration anticipated with climate change.⁷⁰ Kiribati's Joint Implementation Plan finalised in 2017 (listed as its NAP) notes amongst the results it is aiming to achieve the identification of land or property at risk of reduction or disappearance and the possible compensation of landowners.⁷¹

NAPAs and NAPs are not without challenges – revolving also around resource issues which affect planned but often un-costed and broadly conceived activities. Nevertheless, a research respondent noted that, despite the many challenges with international climate finance, it may be time to set a precedent through an international climate finance channel to secure mobility-related support (beyond its prevention).⁷² If this cannot be achieved through an accredited or implementation entity (middleman), then getting a national body accredited to pursue this may be a way forward,⁷³ although this has been less common. That said, there are issues with duplication with accreditation at multiple levels and nationally accredited bodies might also have more restrictions on the amounts of funding that can be awarded.⁷⁴

Multilateral development banks

Within and beyond the UNFCCC system, multilateral development banks (MDBs) are committed to implementing the Paris Agreement and are experienced in funding adaptation and mitigation measures, as well as loss and damage-aligned risk reduction and resilience building activities,⁷⁵ which arguably have a mobility prevention dimension.⁷⁶ The regional Asian Development Bank (ADB), in particular, has experience in setting up dedicated funds, supported by donors, to address specific climate-related risks and their management.⁷⁷ Recently, this has included the *Ireland Trust Fund for Building Climate Change and Disaster Resilience in Small Island Developing States* in the Pacific, announced in 2019. In the last two years, this fund has discharged USD 5 million of its USD 13.4 million budget in building community infrastructure and coastal resilience.⁷⁸

Multilateral development banks are also involved in funding activities related to migration, especially where it relates to development – in the context of labour and rural-to-urban migration, for example. Activities supported have included in-country migrant support and reintegration support.⁷⁹ Displacement is supported by, amongst others, the World Bank and Islamic Development Bank via the *Global Concessional Financing Facility* (GCFF), which provides favourable-terms support to some middle-income countries seeking to address the economic and social impacts of hosting large numbers of displacees.⁸⁰ Perhaps more relevant, the World Bank Group, in a 2016 report, states that “[t]he Bank provides support for mitigating disaster risk, including migration in

68 Jon Sward and Samuel Codjoe, 'Human Mobility and Climate Change Adaptation Policy: A Review of Migration in National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)' (Working Paper 6, Migrating out of Poverty, University of Sussex, 2012).

69 Government of Fiji, *Republic of Fiji National Adaptation Plan: A Pathway Towards Climate Resilience* (UNFCCC, 2018), Action 9.8, available here: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/Documents/Parties/National%20Adaptation%20Plan_Fiji.pdf.

70 Ibid, Action 14.6.

71 Government of Kiribati, *Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan: 2019-2028* (UNFCCC, 2019), Result 6.5, available here: <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/Documents/Parties/Kiribati-Joint-Implementation-Plan-for-Climate-Change-and-Disaster-Risk-Management-2019-2028.pdf>.

72 Pers. com., Pia Treichel, above n 53.

73 On establishing national implementing bodies, see also PIFS, above n 61.

74 With respect to the Green Climate Fund, Fiji, for example, can access a maximum of USD10 million for a project submitted through its Nationally Accredited Entity (FBD).

75 Hirsch *et al.* above n 50, 46.

76 Mercy Corps, 'Financing Flood Resilience: An Option to Avert Displacement' (2019), available here: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/201901151715---MercyCorps_ResilienceFinancingBrief.pdf.

77 Also, ADB, *Asia-Pacific Climate Finance Fund* (2021), available here: <https://www.adb.org/what-we-do/funds/asia-pacific-climate-finance-fund>

78 Asian Development Bank, 'Ireland and ADB Helping Small Island States in the Pacific Respond to Climate Change', online, 12 March 2021, available here: <https://www.adb.org/news/features/ireland-adb-helping-small-island-states-pacific-respond-climate-change> (currency not stated).

79 World Bank Group, 'Migration and Development: A Role for the World Bank Group' (2016) 24f, available here: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/690381472677671445/pdf/108105-BR-PUBLIC-SecM2016-0242-2.pdf>

80 Global Concessional Financing Facility, About Us (2021), available here: <https://globalcff.org/about-us/>

national adaptation plans, and designing social protection programs to reduce the vulnerability of the poor”.⁸¹ Getting mobility into NAPs may therefore be key in attracting MDB funding for climate-related mobility.

A word of caution, however. Regionally, the ADB has not to date financed projects with a concrete climate mobility dimension. The ADB also extends only about 1.7% of its budget in the Pacific region and its climate-related funding vastly prioritises mitigation-related activities over adaptation-related activities (or loss and damage, for that matter).⁸²

Humanitarian and disaster-related funding

Human displacement on account of natural disasters affects up to 50,000 Pacific Islanders per year,⁸³ presenting a humanitarian challenge that is exacerbated by the effects of climate change.⁸⁴ The response to disaster displacement tends to be driven by national governments, in collaboration with development and civil society partners.⁸⁵ Financial support in situations of disaster displacement will, undoubtedly, continue to involve humanitarian and development partners. Responses have tended to be reactive (‘after the storm’) but there has been a marked shift to proactive planning by regional governments and the humanitarian sector, which have identified that their response must include the development of legal frameworks and guidelines and the tying of development initiatives with displacement.⁸⁶ The ongoing Pacific Response to Disaster Displacement project tackles this through work areas, including data collection, mapping, risk modeling and policy development.⁸⁷ Projects such as these may well also attract funding under the adaptation funding channels already outlined.

Regionally, the overall response to address climate change and disasters is governed by the *Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific* (FRDP), which contains mobility policy,⁸⁸ though not specifically concerning finance. With reference to regional finance, the following are of some relevance.

Regional disaster risk and risk reduction financing

As noted, multilateral development banks provide risk reduction finance in the disaster and climate change context, including through the provision of risk finance tools. Regionally, amongst Pacific Island nations, those affiliated with, or grown out of MDB initiatives, also include sovereign catastrophe risk insurance (nation level support), sovereign micro insurance (household level support) and contingent disaster funding (a guaranteed line of credit following a natural disaster). These are triggered following the occurrence of a natural disaster, providing post-disaster relief.⁸⁹ None has an express mobility dimension, although arguably, they affect mobility through the provision of post-disaster finance, which may allow some to stay (e.g. voluntary immobility) and others to return soon.

81 World Bank Group, above n 75, 25. Note also World Bank, ‘Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Change Migration’ (2018), information available here: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2018/03/19/groundswell---preparing-for-internal-climate-migration>

82 ADB Data Library, Climate Change Financing at ADB (2021), available here: <https://data.adb.org/dashboard/climate-change-financing-adb>

83 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Pacific Response to Disaster Displacement (2019), available here https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/brochure_prdd_final_260520_min_v2.pdf

84 ReliefWeb, ‘Pacific Governments Call for Urgent Action on Disaster Displacement in Light of the Climate Crisis’, online, 11 February 2021, available here: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/pacific-governments-call-urgent-action-disaster-displacement-light-climate-crisis>

85 See also the IASC’s Grand Bargain, a major initiative in support of humanitarian support, information available here: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain>

86 Ibid.

87 IDMC, above n 80, 2; Financial support stems from the EU with partners including also IDMC, IOM and PDD.

88 Available here: http://gsd.spc.int/frdp/assets/FRDP_2016_Resilient_Dev_pacific.pdf

89 Note also, e.g. the UN Trust Fund on Disaster Risk Reduction and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery in this context: <https://eird.org/esp/acerca-eird/liderazgo/perfil/donorsec9e.html?by=2&o=asc> and <https://www.gfdr.org/en>

Pacific Resilience Facility

Acknowledging gaps and shortcomings with respect to international and existing regional finance channels (e.g. fragmentation, high transaction costs), the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF) has now emerged with the express purpose to provide up-front funding for small-scale (USD 50,000 to 200,000) community-level resilience building and safeguarding of vulnerable groups in the context of disasters, climate change and other hazards in the region.⁹⁰ A multi-donor-funded trust fund (the vision is for private and public donors), the fund is to be capitalised with USD 1.5 billion to be invested to generate income, with the capital base to be preserved and disbursements no greater than net income. An initial equitable triennial disbursement of USD 180 million amongst regional nations is envisioned for the first three years of operation,⁹¹ via existing in-country channels,⁹² thereafter in three-year cycles. A detailed prospectus on the fund notes multiple projects as being eligible for attracting funding, with most concerning small-scale infrastructure enhancements at the community level.⁹³ Climate mobility (migration, relocation, displacement, etc.) is not expressly mentioned in the prospectus and with respect to mobility it seems to support mobility prevention measure, in other words, those that enable individuals and communities to stay. Should the fund support the movement of people from one place to another as a resilience-building or adaptation measure, then the size of support for individual projects (up to USD 200,000) would facilitate the movement of only a small number of people at a time. Larger-scale movement would involve the additional financial support of others (see section on costs above).

Pacific Resilience Fund

The Canada-based Pacific Peoples' Partnership (PPP) hosts the Pacific Resilience Fund (also PRF), which it describes as transforming into an Indigenous-led Fund (ILF). Projects the Fund supports are small-scale, grassroots, community-led, often concerning vulnerable groups, including women, and are about building long-term resilience to climate change. The Fund is in a trial phase in 2020/2021. A small number of projects have so far been supported whose connection to mobility is in the sense that people are enabled to stay *in situ*.⁹⁴

Domestic/Bilateral

Public authorities in the domestic context in the region, often with assistance from international and regional partners, have tended to support pre-emptive evacuations and post-disaster mobility in relation to sudden onset hazards. This type of mobility, and the support required, will continue with climate change but at least some of the environmental changes stemming from climate change are also slow or incremental, such as sea-level rise (although this interacts with storm surges) and drought. Responses to such changes are different from the post-disaster context, including with respect to mobility. Preparing and planning for mobility in this context is likely, as is the planned relocation of communities to locales that offer longer-term livelihoods and habitation opportunities.

As has been highlighted, international or regional funding has so far not emerged as a notable funding source for this type of mobility support. There is, however, emerging experience in the domestic context. Fiji has matched its principles-based instruments concerning displacement and relocation in the context of climate change and disasters with a *Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund*, acknowledging implicitly that financial resources are required to facilitate and support mobility. The act that establishes the fund notes that resources are to be allocated for research, location assessment and planning, as well as post-mobility livelihoods security.⁹⁵ The fund is to

90 See Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, *Prospectus: Pacific Resilience Facility – Building Community Resilience in Extraordinary Times* (2021), available here: <https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/PRFFinalMay2021.pdf>

91 Ibid, 16

92 Pacific Island Forum Secretariat: *Brochure: The Pacific Resilience Facility* (2021), available here: <https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/PRF-Brochure.pdf>

93 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, above n 87, 10

94 Pacific Peoples' Partnership, *Pacific Resilience Fund* (2021), available here: <https://pacificpeoplespartnership.org/pacific-resilience-fund/#>

95 Fiji Parliament, *An Act to Establish A Trust Fund for the Planned Relocation of Communities in Fiji that are Adversely Affected by Climate Change*

be seeded with revenue from Fiji's domestic Environment and Climate Adaptation Levy and is further seeking contributions from international partners, of which New Zealand has gone first, offering a USD 2 million contribution.⁹⁶

A 2018 paper concerning climate finance readiness in the Asia-Pacific region supports this approach, in noting that regional SIDS should contemplate reducing their reliance on multilateral (or private, for that matter) sources of climate-related finance, in favour of bilateral or remittance sources.⁹⁷ In the context of mobility, this may look something like Bangladesh's *Climate Bridge Fund*, established by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC, an NGO) and supported by Germany's state-owned development and investment bank, KfW. It amounts to a direct finance mechanism supporting local NGOs supporting urban adaptation activities and adaptation measures in the context of climate-induced migration, with the ultimate goal of providing at least bridging funding towards the establishment of sustainable livelihoods for climate migrants and their resilience to further climate risks.⁹⁸ One research participant also noted that in bilateral funding arrangements, donors might be more amenable to fund certain aspects of mobility, such as planning, technical and contextual support, rather than an actual community relocation in and of itself.⁹⁹

A paper reviewing financing options for planned relocation highlights a multitude of funding options in the domestic context (in developing as well as developed countries) that may be of relevance in the Pacific Island region.¹⁰⁰ Trust funds, such as Fiji's, are noted, which in Fiji's case will contribute up to FJD 5 million per year via its Environment and Climate Adaptation Levy (ECAL) (in addition to bilateral sources such as New Zealand's contribution). ECAL is collected by charging 5% on gross annual turnover of prescribed services (most connected to tourism, entertainment and recreation).¹⁰¹

In this context, one respondent¹⁰² also noted *Bangladesh's Climate Change Trust Fund* (BCCTF), established over a decade ago and seeded with substantial government funding sources (e.g. USD 100 million annually).¹⁰³ Although not set up with mobility in mind per se, one of its six focal areas (pillars) revolves around food security, social protection and health.¹⁰⁴

Tonga's Climate Change Trust Fund, approved in 2012, is also of some relevance, set up to manage domestic climate-related impacts, including at the community level, with funding prioritising women's groups and NGOs, and support available up to USD 250,000 per project.¹⁰⁵ The fund was seeded with a USD 5 million grant from ADB and further inputs are sought from development and other partners.

Finally, *Tuvalu's Climate Change and Disaster Survival Fund* ought to be mentioned. Also not set up with mobility in mind per se, it was set up in 2015 to support recovery after disasters, as

(Act No. 21 of 2019), 24 June 2019, available here: <http://www.parliament.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Act-21-Climate-Relocation-of-Communities-Trust-Fund.pdf>

96 SBS News, New Zealand Commits Millions to Climate Relocation Fund for Fiji (27 Feb 2020) available at: <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/new-zealand-commits-millions-to-climate-relocation-fund-for-fiji>; also Fiji Revenue and Customs Service, *Environment & Climate Adaptation Levy (ECAL)* (2021), available here: <https://www.frsc.org.fj/our-services/taxation/business/environmental-levy/>

97 Jale Samuwei and Jeremy Maxwell Hills, 'Assessing Climate Finance Readiness in the Asia-Pacific Region' (2018) 10(4) *Sustainability* 1192; see also PIFS, above n 61 supporting a domestic/bilateral approach to climate finance in PNG

98 See *Climate Bridge Fund*, available here: <http://www.brac.net/program/climate-bridge-fund/>. Note also again the Grand Bargain in relation to supporting local or regional NGOs with humanitarian funding, above n 82

99 Pers. com., Alvin Chandra, above n 32

100 Boston *et al*, above n 20, 160ff.

101 Fiji Revenue and Customs Service, above n 25

102 Pers. com., Kees van der Geest (Institute for Environment and Human Security, United Nations University, Bonn), 1st September 2021 (online).

103 Presentation, Status of Climate Finance and NAMA in Bangladesh, Wahida Musarrat Anita, Senior Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests, available here: https://unfccc.int/files/focus/mitigation/application/pdf/bangladesh_regional_workshop_on_nama_pptx_revised.pdf

104 Ibid

105 UNFCCC, *Tonga Climate Change Trust Fund – Tonga* (2021), available here: <https://unfccc.int/climate-action/momentum-for-change/activity-database/tonga-climate-change-trust-fund>

well as resilience-building to climate change impacts in the domestic context. The Government of Tuvalu seeded the fund with USD 5 million and has made other contributions since, although the expectation is that external funding channels also contribute. One research respondent highlighted the value of integrating climate mobility resourcing into “national development budgeting and planning processes”, in an effort to support alignment of sustainable development processes with disaster risk/vulnerability assessment and planning.¹⁰⁶

The review paper also notes a dedicated tax to support acquisition of property in hazardous areas¹⁰⁷ or, indeed, emergency funding (essentially from taxes) for land acquisition and preparation for relocation purposes.¹⁰⁸ This, however, is a challenge in many regional contexts.¹⁰⁹ Taxes or levies in support of domestic mobility arising in the context of climate change could originate from a number of sources. Fiji’s Environment and Climate Adaptation Levy has already been noted. There are other related regional examples, including Palau’s environmental impact fee of USD 100 as part of departure taxes for non-Palau passport holders, applied to domestic marine conservation efforts there,¹¹⁰ and a recycling fee of USD 0.1 on drink cans in Federated States of Micronesia, applied to recycling efforts there.¹¹¹

Insurance schemes in support of mobility in the domestic context have been highlighted, including for purposes of relocation.¹¹² These may find support from international funding channels in the loss and damage and disaster risk management context, as discussed above.

Finally, affected communities themselves get together around savings groups to facilitate relocation.¹¹³ Remittances may play a part here. According to one respondent, remittances are already playing a part in facilitating mobility across borders, where an external migration channel exists, with remittance flows stemming from Marshallese already based in the United States (US) applied to facilitate the migration to the US of others.¹¹⁴ Another respondent noted that, in the case of village relocations in Fiji, women’s groups have sought to contribute to relocation financing efforts by saving funding provided to communities when hosting government or NGO activities.¹¹⁵ Another respondent noted that annual fundraising days have made a contribution to planned relocations in Fiji.¹¹⁶ Direct, grassroots level funding channels were highlighted by several research respondents.¹¹⁷ One emphasised their likely beneficial impact in affected communities in conjunction with “the mobilization of community exchange networks to find relocation sites compatible with patterns of customary land ownership”.¹¹⁸

106 Pers. com., Patrina Dumar, above n 17

107 Boston *et al.* above n 20, 161

108 Fiji government support for the village of Vunidogoloa is a case in point. Vunidogoloa’s relocation was financially supported by various sources, including ca. USD 350,000 from the government. But note Rebecca Monson and Daniel Fitzpatrick on the limits of the state in relation to land acquisition for climate mobility in the region, ‘Negotiating Relocation in a Weak State: Land Tenure and Adaptation to Sea-level Rise in Solomon Islands’ in Susanna Price and Jane Singer (eds), *Global Implications of Development, Disasters and Climate Change: Responses to Displacement from Asia Pacific* (Routledge, 2016) 240–255

109 Note, e.g. Rebecca Monson and Daniel Fitzpatrick on the limits of the state in relation to land acquisition for climate mobility in the region, ‘Negotiating Relocation in a Weak State: Land Tenure and Adaptation to Sea-level Rise in Solomon Islands’ in Susanna Price and Jane Singer (eds), *Global Implications of Development, Disasters and Climate Change: Responses to Displacement from Asia Pacific* (Routledge, 2016) 240–255

110 The fee is referred to as the *Pristine Paradise Environmental Fee*; see also Pacific Note, ‘Palau Collects \$100 Pristine Paradise Fee’, 11 January 2018 (online), available here: <https://www.pacificnote.com/single-post/2018/01/11/pay-extra-cost-to-enter-the-pristine-paradise>

111 Bottle Bill Resource Guide, *Federated States of Micronesia*, available here: <https://www.bottlebill.org/index.php/current-and-proposed-laws/worldwide/federated-states-of-micronesia>.

112 Boston *et al.* above n 20, 161.

113 *Ibid.*

114 Pers. com., Kees van der Geest, above n 99.

115 Pers. com., Frances Namoumou, above n 31.

116 Pers. com., Celia McMichael, above n 34.

117 E.g. pers. com., Alvin Chandra, above n 32.

118 Pers. com., Susanna Price, above n 21.

5.0 PLANNED RELOCATION AND HUMAN MOBILITY FINANCING: FUNDING PRINCIPLES

Financing planned relocation and mobility in the context of climate change in the Pacific Island region more broadly functions in a system of scarcity, with demand for financial resources outstripping supply. This makes a principled approach to guide the distribution of financial resources all the more important, in an effort to ensure that financial resources are applied equitably, where most needed and also where they are able to most make a difference. Relevant principles from different contexts may well apply, depending on mobility scenario and funding source. The following is an attempt to broadly sketch relevant principles, as they have already been enunciated by regional actors.

First and foremost, with climate mobility arising in the context of anthropogenic climate change, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities which underpins the international climate finance architecture in general must also underpin considerations of climate mobility finance, where the expectation cannot be that affected communities or nations go it alone. Causality channels in relation to climate mobility are diffuse but this cannot be a stumbling block to accessing the resources necessary to facilitate or prevent mobility, as the case may be.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), an international humanitarian coordination forum within the United Nations system, has identified eight criteria to guide the implementation of durable solutions for internal displacement,¹¹⁹ with some relevance to climate mobility finance. The criteria call for: (i) long-term safety and security; (ii) an adequate standard of living without discrimination; (iii) access to livelihoods and employment; (iv) effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing/land/property if possible, or compensation for their loss; (v) access to or replacement of documentation without discrimination; (vi) access to family reunification; (vii) non-discriminatory participation in public affairs; and (viii) effective remedies for violations that led to displacement (including reparations). Some of these might be more relevant when considering international funding sources (e.g. recompense for climate-related mobility under frameworks, including loss and damage), others when considering domestic arrangements (e.g. public affairs participation).

Vanuatu's disaster and climate change displacement policy embraces these principles, noting further that durable solutions for internal displacement can include sustainable return or re-integration, sustainable local integration, not least in places of temporary refuge, and sustainable integration elsewhere within country, not least in the context of planned relocations.¹²⁰ Its policy seeks to attain this as relevant by taking a cross-cutting systems- and (government) sector-based approach. Guiding principles in the policy revolve around rights, participation, resilience and sustainability, equity, as well as respect for custom and protection of traditional knowledge.¹²¹

Fiji's guidelines concerning relocation and displacement in the context of disasters and climate change revolve around rights (including to participation in decision-making), capacity-building and livelihoods in implementing three stages of mobility (prior, during and afterwards). Planned relocation, in particular, is considered a last resort option, one that should be implemented as other options are exhausted and with community support. Mobility initiatives must also cater to those who have decided not to move and mobility is framed in a broader context of preparing for and managing other hazards, including future hazards stemming from climate change. Planning, reporting and assessment are emphasised, to ensure transparency, inclusion and capacity building, including for those yet to move.

119 Brookings Institution, IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (2010, Project on Internal Displacement, The Brookings Institution – University of Bern), available here: <https://www.unhcr.org/50f94cd49.pdf>.

120 Government of Vanuatu, above n 25, 16.

121 Ibid, 17

Elsewhere, Boston *et al.* frame principles to guide the financing of planned relocation around (i) long-term cost minimisation, including by ensuring that relocation indeed takes place to a safer, more durable location; (ii) intra- and inter-generational equity; (iii) minimisation of disruption and uncertainty for those relocated, including through participatory planning and timely funding distribution; (iv) funding integration with other national strategies for sustainable development and resilience, in other words with broader adaptation, resilience-building and sustainability measures;¹²² and (v) transparency and accountability in funding allocation, including through high-quality monitoring, reporting and assessment.¹²³

6.0 PLANNED RELOCATION AND HUMAN MOBILITY FINANCING: GOVERNANCE

Climate mobility finance is emerging. That said, sources remain scarce – and so do relevant governance structures. Internationally, dedicated bodies concerning climate mobility include the Taskforce on Displacement and the Platform on Disaster Displacement, and they do important work on the issue, as well as driving knowledge, policy and best practice formation. Their work currently, however, does not concretely revolve around mobility finance. International climate finance more broadly is governed by the structures underpinning the various climate finance mechanisms, including those discussed above, which have not proven particularly relevant or accessible to mobility concerns, other than mobility prevention. Regionally, the emerging Pacific Resilience Facility will seek to implement strong governance structures, including review processes that should ensure that facility finance reaches the most vulnerable communities, as mandated.¹²⁴ In the domestic context, Fiji’s climate relocation trust fund is managed by the Ministry of Economy, which has annual reporting duties, with parliament and cabinet oversight.

Research respondents repeatedly noted how diffuse financing applications and resource disbursement channels are to be avoided. One respondent noted how multi-actor involvement in community relocations can lead to fractured resource roll-out (different ministries, public authorities involved, etc.), leading to resources not being applied as intended, sometimes being wasted, as divergent processes are implemented and communication channels lack clarity.¹²⁵ Vanuatu’s displacement policy, which outlines concrete responsibilities in some detail, may prove a step in the right direction. Generally, easier access and simplified procedures, ones that do not in themselves require resources, which in the region are often scarce, point to a way forward.

7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

Needs and costs

Mobility-related finance in the climate change context ought to:

- extend to the mobile as well as the immobile;
- extend to cover not only post-disaster displacement but also planned mobility, where it is currently particularly scarce;
- extend to detailed planning and preparation, mobility itself and post-mobility assessment and adjustment; and
- extend to both tangible and intangible costs and needs.

¹²² E.g. the aforementioned relocation of the Fijian village of Vunidogoloa involved housing construction in the new location which implemented solar panel installation and natural system running water: see Borsa, above n 38. One research respondent also noted rightly that integration must also now be with post-Covid recovery; pers. com. Patrina Dumarua, above n 17.

¹²³ Boston *et al.* above n 20, 163ff. Note that the authors cover developed and developing country contexts jointly.

¹²⁴ See Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, above n 87, 23.

¹²⁵ Pers. com., Frances Namoumou, above n 31.

Sources

Sourcing mobility finance in the climate change context may be enabled by:

- encompassing mobility, including its financing or resourcing in broad climate change policies at all levels;
- ensuring that regional nations have submitted a NAP in which mobility-related activities are expressly noted and well delineated;
- initiating a funding application under an international finance mechanism which concerns climate-related mobility – beyond its prevention;
- seeking national-level accreditation or designation to support such a funding application, where working through an implementing or accredited agency at the regional level or beyond is not feasible;
- continued regional advocacy to support efforts to secure funding channels for loss and damage within international climate finance;
- ensuring that regional funding arrangements can support climate mobility beyond its prevention, as well as supporting desired immobility;
- setting up domestic funding sources that can be resourced and linked with domestic and bilateral support, as well as support from further afield;
- seeking bilateral support for aspects of mobility with a high degree of likelihood – planning, assessment, contextual support, etc.;
- setting up domestic sources in such a way as not to burden domestic populations; and
- supporting community efforts to secure and attract mobility funding and resourcing that is mindful of climate justice principles and that does not detract from the allocation of such resources to other valuable purposes in communities.

Principles

Mobility finance sources in the climate change context ought to prioritise projects that implement mobility:

- in contexts of high vulnerability;
- that is desired (by those concerned);
- that is appropriate in scope and where other options have been exhausted;
- that leads to safer, more durable or sustainable habitation and livelihoods;
- through inclusive and equitable consultation and participation of those concerned and transparent implementation;
- that is mindful of the needs of particular groups – including women, children and other particularly vulnerable groups;
- in conjunction with other adaptation, resilience-building or sustainability measures;
- that is efficient and well-planned;
- that provides for options to stay, as desired and feasible;
- that provides connectivity to the place and/or community of origin, as well as traditions and custom; and

- that can accommodate reporting, monitoring and assessment to cater for transparency in spending, ensuring appropriate delivery to populations affected, and to build best practice.

Governance

Governance of mobility finance in the climate change context ought to:

- ensure the implementation of the principles enumerated above;
- ensure the implementation of simple, easily accessible sources;
- ensure the implementation of better linkages between sources presently fractured at the international, regional and domestic/bilateral level;
- ensure the implementation of a simple rollout of resources, with clearly identified responsibilities and communication channels; and
- ensure the implementation of transparent finance and independent reporting, monitoring and assessment.

To conclude, climate change-related mobility finance for the region needs to be accessible, predictable and sustainable, not least given the timeframes involved in proper planning, implementation and evaluation. Such finance must cater for reactive, as well as proactive mobility. Amongst a fractured current funding picture, harmonisation needs to be striven for where possible. Those directly affected must be part of decision-making and implementation, and resource and financing decisions must be motivated by their needs and vulnerabilities.